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you  in your  global  evaluation of the  common  carriage option. 
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SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
1.  In January  1989,  we  presented to  the  European  Commission  (DG  XVII) 
our Final Report  on  a  study entitled "Advantages  and  drawbacks  for  the 
European Community  of the  introduction of a  system of  'common  carrier'  for 
the  transportation of natural gas".  The  terms  of reference  for  the  study 
required us  to spell out  the key  advantages  and  drawbacks  of common 
carriage  for  consumers,  the  gas  industry and  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
2.  In the  light of our  conclusions,  we  were  then asked to carry out a 
short piece of follow-up  work which  would provide  some  elements  of 
quantification not  included in the  terms  of reference  for  the  main  study 
referred to above.  The  quantitative assessment  is set out  in this 
follow-up  report and concerns:-
(a)  the  level of border prices  for  imports  into  the  Community; 
(b)  efficiency in  transmission and distribution; 
(c)  redistribution of  income  (between  gas  companies  and  consumers,  or 
between different classes of consumers);  and 
(d)  macro-economic  effects. 
3.  It must  be  stressed at the outset that these  are not areas  in which 
precise  and purely objective quantitative assessments  can be  made.  This 
reflects both  the  limited availability of commercially  sensitive 
information and  the nature of  the  issues  involved.  We  have  therefore had 
to  rely on  a  combination of best estimates  and  informed subjective 
judgements  in a  number  of areas.  Our  overall conclusions  are,  in our view, 
reasonable,  but should not be  interpreted as  anything other than "order of 
magnitude"  indications. 
Extent  of Common  Carriage 
4.  The  most  important effects of common  carriage are  likely to be 
indirect and may  well  be  out of all proportion to  the  extent of direct 
marketing which  actually takes  place.  The  mere  threat of  increased competition,  underlined by  a  limited amount  of actual  competition betweE!n 
gas  suppliers,  is likely to  erode  monopoly  profits  and  encourage 
efficiency,  as  existing gas  suppliers  respond to  increased pressures  in the 
market place.  In  this  sense,  the  actual extent of direct marketing via 
common  carriage  is  a  secondary  issue.  Nevertheless,  quantitative assessment 
of  the direct effects  (loss of market by existing suppliers)  requires  a 
view of  the  likely use  of common  carriage rights. 
5.  In our view,  the  number  of consumers  both willing and able  to 
conclude direct purchases  is  likely to be  small  - mainly  large industrial 
users  and  power  plants.  Moreover,  the major  gas  producing countries  are: 
unlikely to embark on an aggressive price-cutting battle for market  share, 
while  gas  transmission companies  faced with  the  threat of direct sales 
competition may  make  pre-emptive  reductions  in their own  selling prices  to 
some  large users. 
6.  For  these  reasons,  we  do  not consider  that direct sales via common 
carriage would  account  for  more  than about  4:~  of the  total Community  gas 
market  in 2000,  even if such  a  system were  introduced by  the  end of 1992. 
We  expect  the  use  of common  carriage  to  be higher  than average  in the  UK 
(perhaps  7%  of  the market)  and  somewhat  lowe:r  (around  3%)  elsewhere  in the 
Community. 
Border Gas  Prices 
7.  The  view has  sometimes  been  advanced  that common  carriage will 
unleash  increased competition between  gas  producers,  considerably reducing 
the  level of prices for  gas  imported  into  thja  Community.  In its simple 
form,  we  do  not  consider this  argument  to  be  very credible;  common  carriage 
may  introduce  new  gas  buyers  into  the market,  but it does  not of itself 
change  the  number  of sellers.  Intensified c<>mpetition may  take place  to 
some  extent where  large new  markets  are available  (gas-fired power 
generation,  for  example),  but widespread price cutting seems  most unlikely 
in the oligopolistic conditions  of  the  EuropE~an gas  market.  Nevertheless, 
there would be  some  increased competitive  prE~ssure  on existing gas  buyers 
to negotiate  the best possible  import  deals. 
b 
.. 8.  We  would  therefore  expect  a  fairly modest  reduction in  the  average 
cost of gas  imported  into  the  Community;  this  is difficult to quantify,  but 
we  would  regard  2-3%  as  a  reasonable  overall estimate  (see paragraphs 
3.20-3.26 below).  This  is equivalent  to perhaps  ECU  175  million p.a.  by 
2000  for  the  Community  as  a  whole,  excluding  the  UK  where  a  right  to  common 
carriage already exists.  There  is also likely to be  some  reduction in the 
costs of new  gas  production within the  Community,  as  a  result of  increased 
competitive pressure.  Taking  this  into account,  the  total  'gas cost' 
benefit attributable to  common  carriage might  be  ECU  250  million p.a. 
However,  these benefits are  only likely to be  achieved if the current 
'buyer's market'  conditions persist.  In a  'seller's market',  which  seems 
unlikely to  recur  for  a  considerable period,  the  increased number  of bulk 
gas purchasers  resulting from  common  carriage rights might  even exacerbate 
the  tendency  to  'bid up'  the  level of prices when  gas  is perceived to  be  in 
short supply. 
Gas  Industry Efficiency 
9.  The  competitive  threat of direct marketing via  common  carriage will 
also bring some  additional pressure  to bear on  gas utilities to  operate 
more  efficiently and  reduce  their non-gas  costs,  especially at  the  level of 
transmission.  The  relationship between competition and efficiency seems 
intuitively plausible,  but  the  evidence  does  not point  to  a  very strong 
link,  at least in the  short  to medium  term.  Nevertheless,  some  benefit 
seems  likely over  a  longer period.  For  example,  a  5%  reduction in 
transmission and storage  costs  across  the  Community  could yield an 
efficiency benefit of about  ECU  300  million p.a.  by  2000,  or  some  ECU  250 
million if the  UK  is excluded on  the  grounds  that common  carriage 
legislation is already  in place  (see paragraphs  4.11-4.12). 
Income  Distribution Effects 
10.  Concern has  been expressed that common  carriage might benefit large 
consumers  at the  expense  of smaller consumers,  or  gas  utilities,  or both. 
While  it is  true  that much  of the  immediate benefit of gas  common  carriage 
would  go  to  large  industrial or power  plant consumers,  competition in 
manufactured  goods  markets  and cost-plus pricing of electricity may  well ensure  that a  large portion of  these  gains  i:s  passed on  to final  consumers. 
To  the extent that  these benefits arise  from  lower border  gas  prices or 
improved efficiency in transmission and distribution,  they will not  give 
rise  to  a  commensurate  disadvantage  for smaller gas  consumers  or gas 
utilities. 
11.  Where  existing sales  to  large  users  incorporate  an element of  . 
monopoly profit,  however,  common  carriage is likely to have  a  negative 
impact  on  the  financial position of transmission companies.  Of  the major 
utilities examined,  British Gas,  Ruhrgas  and  SNAM  appeared to make  more 
than a  'normal'  return on capital in 1987  (table 5.7 below)  and common 
carriage might  to  some  degree  erode  'above  n<>rmal'  margins  in these cases, 
to  the  extent that such high profits persist in future years.  Elsewhere, 
utility returns  tend to be  below  a  'normal •  level and  any  adverse  fi.nancial 
effect on  transmission companies  might be passed on  to smaller customers. 
In general,  we  would  expect  this effect to  bE~  small  (table 5.8),  except 
perhaps  in Member  States at an early stage of gas  industry development 
(such as  Spain)  where unit costs  are high and industrial use still 
dominates  the  gas  market. 
Macro-Economic  Effects 
12.  To  the extent that  gas  common  carriage leads  to  lower  industrial  gas 
prices,  it might be  expected  to contribute  to  an  improved  Community  trad•3 
performance  in world markets  for manufactured goods  and  thus  to an 
increased level of economic  activity in the  longer  term.  Although  some 
manufactures  (such  as  nitrogenous  fertilisers:)  are very gas-intensive,  the 
cost of gas  accounts  for  only around  0.5%  of output value  for  EC  industrial 
production as  a  whole.  For  this  reason,  the external  trade effect is 
likely to be  relatively modest;  we  estimate  an  annual benefit of around gcu 
125  million per year  (paragraph 6.14).  In individual gas-intensive sectors 
(such as  some  steel and  chemical products),  however,  the  'local'  impact  may 
be  proportionately greater. 
Overview 
13.  Focusing  on  the  net benefits of a  common  carriage  system to  the 
Community  as  a  whole,  our best estimates  for  the year  2000  are  as  follows:-
8 (a)  border prices  and  Community  gas  production costs  - around  ECU  250 
million p.a,  provided  that  'buyer's market'  conditions persist; 
(b)  gas  industry efficiency  - around  ECU  250  million p.a;  and 
(c)  macro-economic  (trade)  benefit  - about  ECU  125  million p.a. 
The  combined benefit of  some  ECU  625  million p.a.  is equivalent to around 
2%  of the  Community's  projected total annual  gas  supply costs  in 2000. 
These  figures  exclude  the  UK,  on  the  grounds  that common  carriage 
legislation already exists and  a  decision to  introduce  a  Community-wide 
common  carriage  system would have little additional effect. 
14.  We  should perhaps  emphasise  once  again the  'order of magnitude' 
nature of these  results  and  the  dangers  of reading  too  much  precision into 
our estimates.  Nevertheless,  we  consider  that our analysis  provides  a 
reasonable  guide  to  the broad magnitude  of  the benefits which  might be 
forthcoming. I  INTRODUCTION 
Background  to  the  study 
1.1  In January  1989,  we  submitted to  the  Directorate-General for  Energy 
(DG  XVII)  of the  European  Commission  a  report  on  the  advantages  and 
drawbacks  for  the  European  Community  of the  introduction of a  system of 
"common  carrier"  for  the  transport of natural  gas.  The  principal potential 
advantages  and  drawbacks  identified were  as  follows:-
Advantages 
(a)  the possibility of  lower  gas 
purchase prices,  if direct 
marketing opportunities  lead gas 
producers  to  compete  more 
aggressively for  market  share; 
(b)  the  erosion  (through common 
carriage  arrangements)  of 
monopoly  profits on certain 
high-margin gas  sales  to 
industrial customers; 
(c)  some  increased competitive 
pressure  on  gas  utilities  to 
reduce  overheads  and operate  more 
efficiently; 
(d)  wider  gas  purchase  options  (and 
therefore,  possibly,  lower 
prices)  for  new  gas-fired power 
stations; 
Drawbacks 
(a)  the possibility,  in a  tighter 
gas  market  than exists  today, 
that competition between new  and 
existing bulk gas  buyers  could 
lead  to  a  "bidding up"  of gas 
purchase  prices; 
(b)  possible  increases  in selling 
prices  to  small  consumers,  to 
compensate  gas utilities for  any 
loss of industrial market 
profits; 
(c)  increased market uncertainty 
which  might put at risk the 
necessary long-term  investments 
in gas  supply capacity,  both 
within and  outside  the 
Community; 
(d)  adverse  consequences  of market 
uncertainty for  the  development 
of  "new"  or  infant  gas 
industries. (e)  increased options  for  UK  gas 
producers  to sell  into  the  rest 
of the  Community,  increasing  the 
likelihood of a  cross-channel 
link and  a  further  integration of 
the  European  gas  grid. 
1.2  In accordance with  the  terms  of reference  for  the  original study,  the 
conclusions  set out  above  were  presented in a  largely qualitative manner. 
In a  letter dated 24  February  1989  (reproduced for  reference  in Appendix 
C),  DG  XVII  subsequently asked us  to carry out  some  elements  of 
quantification on  our  key  conclusions  which are  susceptible  to quant:itattve 
analysis.  The  four  effects of  the possible  introduction of a  common 
carriage  system for natural  gas  on which  we  were  asked  to  focus  are  the 
following:-
(i)  possible reductions  in the border price of gas  imported  intc, 
the  Community; 
(ii)  possible  increased efficiency in gas  transmission and 
distribution operations; 
(iii)  possible redistribution of  income  between  gas  companies  and 
consumers,  or between different classes of consumers;  and 
(iv)  an  indication of  the  macro-economic benefit of possible 
reduced industrial gas  prices. 
Quantitative analysis  of these  issues will  then  form  part of the  European 
Commission's  global evaluation of the  desirability of introducing a  commc'n 
carriage  system at Community  level. 
1.3  The  terms  of reference  for  this  study cover not only  the  key areas  in 
which  a  common  carriage  system might  lead  to  .an  overall  improvement  in the 
welfare  of the  Community,  but  also  the possibility of welfare 
redistribution from  one  group  to  another.  Of  particular importance  in the 
latter case are:-
• • 
(a)  an erosion of monopoly  profits  through  increased competition  (which 
also has  resource  allocation benefits  for  total welfare), 
redistributing  income  from  gas utilities to  large  consumers;  and 
(b)  possible  adverse  consequences  for  smaller gas  users,  offsetting 
benefits  to  large  consumers . 
The  most  important of the  possible effects of common  carriage not covered 
by  this  follow-up  study is its impact  on  gas  supply security.  This  does 
not mean  that this effect is neglected,  merely that it is not  readily 
quantifiable. 
A3 
1.4  As  agreed with  DG  XVII,  the  detailed analysis  in this  follow-up  study 
relates  to  the  six main  gas-consuming Member  States which  do  not already 
have  significant common  carriage rights enshrined  in national legislation -
Belgium,  France,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Spain and West  Germany.  The 
United Kingdom,  which established a  legal right to  common  carriage  in 1982 
and substantially reinforced the  legislative and  regulatory framework  in 
1986,  is also  included as  a  reference point.  Having carried out our 
detailed analysis,  we  then extrapolate  the results  to  cover  the other 
Member  States  (Denmark,  Ireland and Luxembourg)  which already have  a 
natural gas  industry and  those  (Greece  and Portugal)  which plan  to develop 
such  an industry in the  1990s. 
Approach  to quantification 
1.5  Our  approach  to quantification in the  four  areas  identified by  DG 
XVII  for  attention is first  to set up  a  framework  for  analysis.  This 
framework  comprises  an  assessment of gas  selling prices,  the various 
elements  of non-gas  costs  and bulk gas  purchase prices  in the  Member  States 
concerned.  Some  of the  elements  in this  assessment  can be  obtained or 
calculated  from  published sources;  others  require  a  degree  of informed 
subjective judgement,  since  gas utilities'  cost structures are  rarely 
published in the  form  required  for  our analysis.  Once  established,  the 
framework  then allows  us  to  trace  the  impact  of common  carriage  on 
efficiency and  the  distribution of  incomes  (issues  (ii)  and (iii)  of the 
four  selected by  DG  XVII)  through  to  changes  in cost levels,  selling prices 
and  gas  utility profit levels. 1.6  Our  analysis  of all  four  areas  to be  covered is set out  in detail 
below.  Briefly,  the  approach  we  have  taken  to  each  area is as  follows:-
(i)  border prices  - a  review of the  limited available evidence  on 
this question and an  informed  judgement as  to  the  range:  of 
probable  outcomes; 
(ii)  efficiency in  transmission and distribution  - analysis of the 
relationship between  competitive  sales market pressures  faced 
by  gas utilities and  their level of efficiency; 
(iii)  redistributional effects  - analysis based on utilities' 
current gross  trading margins,  reasonable  levels of carriage 
charges  and  gas  industry profitability;  and 
(iv)  macro-economic benefits  - a  revj~ew of the  literature on  the 
Community's  trading performance  in world markets  for 
manufactures  (to assess  the  like~ly impact  of any  reduction in 
manufacturing  industry's  gas  costs),  together with  a  case 
study of  the  iron and steel sect:or. 
Structure of  the  report 
1.7  The  analytical  framework  referred  to  above  is set out  in Section II 
below for  each of  the  seven Member  States considered in detail.  Sections 
III,  IV,  V and VI  respectively  then deal with border gas  prices,  gas 
industry efficiency,  income  distribution  effe~cts  and macro-economic 
benefits.  Our  summary  and conclusions  are presented at the beginning of 
the  report  document  for  ease  of reference. 
1.8  Further details of our  cost analysis  are set out  in Appendix  A. 
Appendix  B contains  an  assessment  of the  likely level of direct marketing 
via common  carriage  in each Member  State.  In Appendix  C,  we  present  some 
evidence  on  the  impact  of open  access  transportation in  the U.S.  gas 
industry and Appendix  D contains  the  study  Te~rrns  of Reference. 
• , 
II  ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK 
2.1  As  outlined in the  introduction,  we  have  carried out  an analysis  of 
revenues,  costs  and  netbacks  for  each of the  seven Member  States  examined. 
In this Section,  we  set out briefly our  approach  and  the  results obtained. 
Further details of our analysis  are set out  in Appendix  A. 
Methodology 
2.2  In each country,  we  have  adopted  a  simplified analysis of revenues, 
costs  and netbacks  by market  sector,  using  two  classes of consumer  as 
follows:-
(a)  smaller residential  and  commercial  customers,  who  are  almost 
exclusively supplied  from  the  local distribution grid;  and 
(b)  large  industrial  and  power  station users,  who  are  frequently  supplied 
direct  from  the  transmission grid,  although  significant numbers  of 
industrial users  are  located on distribution grids  in Member  States 
such  as  Denmark,  France,  the United Kingdom  and  West  Germany.  This 
category  includes  both  firm  and  interruptible gas  sales. 
2.3  We  h~ve taken  the year  1987  as  the basis  for  our analysis,  since  this 
is  the most  recent period for  which  comprehensive  data is available.  (In 
interpreting our  results,  it should therefore be  noted that a  single year's 
figures  may  not necessarily be  representative of longer  term  trends).  For 
each  consumer category  in each of  the  seven Member  States  examined  in 
detail,  we  identified or estimated the  average  revenue  obtained  from  gas 
sales to final users,  excluding taxes.  We  then:-
(a)  calculated a  netback at the  point  of bulk gas  delivery  (border, 
beach,  wellhead,  etc)  for  each of the  two  market  sectors,  by 
deducting  the  estimated average  non-gas  costs of supply  to  the  sector 
from  the sector's average  sales  revenue;  and 
(b)  calculated a  net  transmission  company  trading margin  for  each  market 
sector and hence  an  average  net  trading margin  for  natural  gas  sales 
overall,  by  deducting  average  gas  purchase  costs  from  the  netback. The  overall net  margin  is defined  as  equal  to  operating profit before 
interest,  extraordinary  items  and  taxation. 
2.4  We  have  categorised  the  costs  of gas  supply  into  five  basic cost 
elements  as  follows:-
(a)  the  average  cost of  gas  purchases  made  in bulk by  transmission 
companies.  In  some  cases,  such  as  Belgium,  this  is  simply  th~:! 
average border price of  imported gas.  In other instances,  it is  a 
weighted average  of border prices  for  gas  imports  and  the  pric:es  of 
indigenous  gas  supplied  from  producers  to  the  transmission company; 
(b)  the average unit cost of storage,  which  we  define  to  include  the 
costs of underground  storage  (acquifers,  salt caverns,  partially 
depleted gas  fields  etc)  and  overground  LNG  storage  for peak-shaving, 
together with  any  LPG/air  peak-shaving facilities  and seasonal 
production facilities  owned  by  transmission companies  (the British 
Gas  Morecambe  field,  for  example).  Diurnal  and other local  st:orage 
facilities  owned  by distribution companies  are  included separately as 
part of distribution costs; 
(c)  long distance  gas  transmission costs; 
(d)  the  costs of local distribution  (which  may  be  zero  in the  case  of 
transmission companies'  direct sales);  and 
(e)  customer-specific costs,  including  the unit cost of connection,  meter 
reading,  billing and  other specific services.  These  are  significant 
for  small  domestic  and  commercial  customers,  but negligible  (in unit 
cost  terms)  for  large  consumers  in the  industrial and  power  station 
markets. 
The  full detail of our  cost estimates  is set out  in Appendix  A.  For  the 
purposes  of the  summary  presented in this  Sec:tion,  categories  (b)  and  (c) 
are  combined as  transmission level non-gas-costs,  while  (d)  and  (e)  are 
combined  as  distribution level  non-gas  costs. 
2.5  It should be  stressed at  this  stage  that  the  cost data needed  for 
this  exercise  are  not  readily available  in the  form  required and  the  amount 
of information published  also  varies  considerably  from  one  Member  State  to 
another.  In most  cases,  published data provide  a  reasonably  good  guide  to 
• selling prices,  profit margins,  total  expenses  and  (sometimes)  the 
breakdown between  gas  purchase  costs  and  non-gas  costs.  Non-gas  costs  are 
rarely if ever categorised into  customer-related costs,  distribution, 
transmission  and  storage.  In  some  cases,  therefore,  we  have  had  to  rely on 
our  own  estimates,  based on  limited published data and other  information 
available  to us.  The  results obtained should not be  regarded as  precise, 
but we  consider  that  they still provide  a  broadly reasonable  reflection of 
the  true picture  and  a  helpful  framework  for  analysis. 
2.6  The  non-gas  cost  information presented in this  report is based 
largely on  the  company  accounts  set out  in gas utilities'  Annual  Reports 
for  1987.  With  few  exceptions  (such  as  British Gas),  these  accounts  are 
based solely on historical cost accounting  (HCA)  conventions  under  which 
depreciation allowances  are  typically related to  the original cost of 
capital and  equipment,  although  in  some  cases  assets  are  revalued  from  time 
to  time.  Current cost accounting  (CCA)  uses  the full  replacement cost of 
assets  as  the basis of depreciation and  can produce  significantly higher 
cost figures.  For  example,  the  British Gas  accounts  for  1987/88  show 
average  non-gas  operating costs  for  the  company's  gas  supply business  of 
12.2  p/therm  (ECU  0.059/m3)  on  an  HCA  basis.  On  a  CCA  basis,  the 
equivalent figure  is  13.5  p/therm  (ECU  0.066/rn3),  some  11%  higher.  In 
proportionate  terms,  the  difference  between  HCA  and  CCA  unit costs would 
probably be  greater for  a  pure  transmission company  than for  a  vertically 
integrated utility such  as  British Gas,  since  transmission is more 
capital-intensive  than distribution.  This  should be  borne  in mind when  we 
discuss  the  question of  'fair'  carriage  charges  in Section VI,  in 
particular,  since  there  is  a  reasonably  strong argument  that  a  'fair' 
charge  should cover  the  unit  replacement cost of assets  used,  such  as 
pipelines  or storage facilities. 
2.7  Where  the natural  gas  supply  industry  is vertically stratified into 
separate  transmission and distribution companies,  we  have  identified or 
estimated the  average  price at which  gas  is sold  from  transmission 
companies  to  local distributors.  In  such cases,  the  distributors'  own 
profit margins  are  treated as  part of gas  supply  costs  at  the  distribution 
level.  The  split between  transmission level  (transmission and  storage)  and 
distribution level  (distribution and  connection)  non-gas  costs  is  therefore reasonably clear in Belgium,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Spain  and  W~st 
Germany,  since different organisations  are  involved.  For vertically 
integrated utilities such as  British Gas  and  Gaz  de  France,  we  have  had  to 
rely on our  own  estimates,  supported  in  the  former  case by  informatl.on  from 
the  1988  MMC  report. 
2.8  Some  remarks  may  be  appropriate at this stage  regarding  the  estimated 
breakdown of joint non-gas  costs  (for  transmission,  storage  and,  in some 
cases,  local distribution)  between domestic/commercial  and  industry/power 
station markets.  In simple  terms,  industry/power station consumers  impose 
lower  costs  on  the  supplier because of their higher  consumption load 
factors  and,  in many  instances,  the higher grid pressures at which  they are 
supplied.  The  higher  load factors  mean  lower unit  transportation capacity 
costs  and/or a  significantly lower  requirement  for  storage  to meet  the 
seasonal  peak  in demand. 
2. 9  Particular cost allocation problems  arE~  raised by  interruptible sales 
contracts with  large users.  In certain circ\llfistances,  it can be  argued 
that interruptible sales  do  not  impose  any capacity costs.  Moreover,  the 
ability to  interrupt may  have  a  positive value  in terms  of reduced storage 
costs,  since  the utility would  otherwise  haVE!  had  to construct additional 
storage  to meet  the  peak  in firm  gas  demand.  There  is,  in fact,  no 
internationally agreed  approach  to  this cost allocation question,  although 
some  utilities do  put  these  principles  into practice.  Our  approach  is  to 
distinguish several  types  of supply situation and  to  adopt different cost 
allocations  in each  case,  as  follows:-
(a)  Member  States  where  storage  is  relative~ly limited  (Belgium,  Spain, 
West  Germany  and  the  UK)  and  interruption is used in severe  w~nters 
for  seasonal  supply/demand balancing.  In such  cases,  the  system  is 
sized to  meet  peak  firm  gas  demand  and  we  have  therefore  assumed  that 
interruptible sales  do  not bear capacity costs  and also provide  a 
benefit in  terms  of reduced  storage  requirements; 
(b)  Member  States  (France  and  Italy)  where  substantial underground 
storage exists,  for  strategic as  well  as  load-balancing reasons,  and 
interruption is rarely if ever  used  for  seasonal  load balancing. 
Effectively,  the  system  is sized  to  meet  the  combined  peak  in firm and  interruptible  demand  and  interruption would normally  be  used  only 
in the  event  of  a  major  disruption  to  supplies.  We  have  therefore 
assumed  that  interruptible sales  should bear  some  of  the  capacity 
costs  of pipeline  and  storage  facilities;  and 
(c)  the  Netherlands,  where  the  Groningen  field provides  seasonal 
flexibility and  there  is  (as yet)  no  underground storage.  There  are 
some  interruptible contracts  (with power  stations)  but  interruption 
is rarely used  and  we  have  assumed  that interruptible sales  should 
bear  a  proportion of transmission capacity costs. 
Results 
2.10  As  mentioned  above,  a  detailed presentation of our  analysis  and  the 
results obtained is set out  in Appendix  A.  In  this Section,  we  set out  our 
conclusions  in a  simplified form  for  each  of the  two  defined market  sectors 
and for  total natural  gas  sales  in each Member  State  considered.  This 
simplified presentation shows  average  gas  purchase  costs,  distribution 
level non-gas  costs  and  transmission level non-gas  costs,  with  transmission 
companies'  profit margins  separately identified.  The  results of our 
analysis  are set out  on  this basis  in Table  2.1  below  and  illustrated in 
Figures  2.1  to  2.3  respectively for  the  residential and  commercial  sector, 
industry/power sector  and  total  gas  sales  to all sectors  combined. 
Table  2.1  Netback Analysis  Results  for  1987 
(in  ECU/m3  x  100) 
(a)  Domestic/Commercial  Sector 
Average  Selling Price 
Distribution Level 
Transmission  Level 
Gas  Purchase  Costs 
Transmission Co.Margin 
J2. 
20.3 
8.5 
1.8 
2...2 
0.7 
E 
22.1 
4.8 
2.7 
10.1 
4.5 
I 
26.5 
12.0 
4.7 
6.8 
2.9 
NL 
15.4 
4.0 
0.5 
8.2 
2.6 
SP 
41.1 
28.5 
8.0 
L.J. 
(2.7) 
FRG 
20.9 
8.1 
4.6 
7.1 
1.0 
UK* 
19.6 
4. 5 
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2 (b) 
(c) 
Industry/Power  Sector 
~  I  1  NL  SP  FRG 
Average  Selling Price  9.2  10.4  9.1  8.6  13.3  12.0 
Distribution Level  0.3  1.8  1.8 
Transmission Level  1.3  2.0  0.3  2.2  2.0 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  9.2  10.1  6.8  8.2  L.1  Ll. 
Transmission Co.Margin  (1.3)  0.2  2.0  1.0 
Total  Horne  Market  Sales** 
11  .E  l  NL  SP  FRG 
Average  Selling Price  15.5  17.1  16.6  12.1  18.6  16.3 
Distribution Level  4.8  2.9  5.2  2.1  6.9  5.1 
Transmission Level  1.0  2.1  3.2  0.4  3.3  3.0 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  9.2  10.1  ~ 8.2  7.3  7.1 
***  Transmission  Co.Margin  0.4  2.0  1.4  1.4  1.1  1.0 
*  1987/88  financial year  throughout 
**  excludes  exports,  where  relevant  (especially  important  in the 
Netherlands) 
UK 
11.4 
0.8 
0.5 
8.3 
1.9 
UK 
17.1 
3.4 
2.2 
8.3 
3.2 
***  derived from  Annual  Reports;  net operating profit before  interest, 
extraordinary  items  and  tax 
2.11  Although  some  of the  estimates  set out above  should be  regarded as 
indicative rather  than precise,  a  number  of features  do  emerge  which  are 
salient to  the  impact  of  gas  common  carriage:-
(a)  the  level  and  structure of  gas  supply  costs varies  considerably as 
between Member  States,  depending  on  factors  such  as  the  source  and 
load factor  of gas  supplies,  the  geographical  size of  che  country, 
the  grid location of different customers,  the  type  of storage 
facilities  and  their capacity,  the  manner  in which  seasonal  storage 
and  interruptible contracts  are  used  to  balance  supply  and  demand, 
the penetration of  gas  into  domestic  markets  and  the  size  and 
structure of  the utilities responsible  for  gas  distribution.  High non-gas  costs  in Spain,  for  example,  appear  to reflect low  levels of 
grid utilisation and  considerable up-front  costs  in  the  early stages 
of  gas  industry development; 
(b)  on average,  gas  purchase  costs  account  for  a  very  large proportion of 
the price at which  gas  is sold  to  final  consumers  - typically around 
50%,  with variations  from  about  40%  in Spain  to  as  much  as  two-thirds 
in the Netherlands,  where  the  cost of providing seasonal  supply 
flexibility is effectively part of the price at which  Gasunie 
purchases  gas  from  NAM; 
(c)  the majority of non-gas  costs of supply  is generally incurred at  the 
distribution level,  for  the  gas  market  considered as  a  whole.  This 
is especially true  of residential  and  commercial  sales;  in most 
cases,  the non-gas  costs of supply  to  large industrial and  power 
station customers  are mainly  or entirely incurred at  the  level of 
transmission and  storage; 
(d)  the unit net  trading margin  (operating profit before  interest, 
extraordinary  items  and  taxation)  earned by  transmission companies 
on  their total sales  in 1987  was  typically around  ECU  O.Ol/m3  or  a 
little higher.  Margins  were  lower  than average  in Belgium 
(Distrigaz),  in particular.  In the  Netherlands,  the  reported margin 
of  ECU  0.014/m3  for  total home  market  sales considerably exceeds  the 
overall Gasunie  operating profit for  1987.  This  is because  we 
estimate  a  much  lower  margin  on  export sales,  which are  excluded  from 
Table  2.1.  The  figures  for  the  UK  and  France  cannot be  directly 
compared with  those  of other Member  States,  since  the  British Gas  and 
Gaz  de  France  operating margins  reflect the vertically integrated 
nature  of their gas  supply businesses.  If the overall  BG  and  GdF 
margins  were  compared  with  total operating profit in other Member 
States  (with  transmission  and local distribution company  margins 
combined),  then  they would  not  appear  unduly  high;  and 
(e)  in all Member  States  examined except  Spain,  domestic  and  commercial 
sales  appear  to  provide  a  netback  (to beach,  border or other point of 
bulk  gas  purchase)  which  at least equals  the  average  gas  purchase 
price.  In  the  large  users'  market  sector,  netbacks  in France  appear 
to be  below  the  average  cost of gas  purchases.  Sales  to  large users 
seem  to  be  most  profitable  in Spain,  West  Germany  and  the  UK. 25 
2.12  It should be  recalled that  these  results are based  for  simplicity on 
a  single year's  data.  Nevertheless,  they  may  provide  some  useful  pointers 
to  the  likely attractiveness of direct marketing via  common  carriage,  both 
for  gas  consumers  in the  Member  States  concerned and  for  producers  who 
might  wish  to sell their gas  direct.  They  also provide  a  framework  within 
which  the  possible quantitative  impact of a  gas  common  carriage  system can 
be  assessed. III  BORDER  GAS  PRICES 
Introduction 
3.1  One  of  the  arguments  advanced  for  gas  common  carriage  is  that it 
would  encourage  more  competitive  marketing by  gas  producers  and  lead  to  a 
general  reduction  in  the  level of  imported  (or wellhead)  gas  prices.  It is 
suggested that  gas  buyers,  adhering  to  a  broad  'netback'  principle for 
setting gas  purchase  prices,  have  paid  too high  a  price for  imported gas. 
Since  a  number  of gas  producing countries currently have  very substantial 
unexploited reserves  and  (in some  cases)  excess  deliverability into  the 
Community,  it is suggested  that  a  competitiv,e  market price would be  belc1w 
the  netback  level set in relation to  the value  of gas  marketed against 
alternative fuels. 
3.2  On  the  other hand,  a  counter-argument  is  sometimes  made  that  the 
introduction of new  gas  buyers via  common  carriage  (with  the  number  of 
producers  unchanged)  would  simply  lead to  a  "bidding up"  of gas  purchase 
prices,  especially in a  tighter gas  market  than prevails  today. 
3. 3  Although  the  level of bulk gas  purchas~~ prices is a  key  issue,  there 
is very little in  the  way  of quantitative evidence  to  be  produced for 
either view.  Thus  a  substantial degree  of subjective  judgement  is 
necessarily required when  assessing  the  likely outcome.  It is nevertheless 
important  to consider  the  limited evidence which  is available.  This 
Section of the  report  therefore  outlines  the  available evidence  from  U.S. 
and  European experience,  together with  our  own  assessment  of the  impact 
which  common  carriage might  have  on  the  general  level of prices  for  gas 
imported  into  the  Community. 
U.S.  Experience 
3.4  Although  the  U.S.  gas  supply situation is very different  from  that 
prevailing in  the  Community,  we  nevertheless  consider it helpful  to  assess 
the quantitative  impact  of  open  access  transportation since  around  1984. 
The  impact  of common  carriage  on  imported  gas  prices  in  Europe  is most 
unlikely  to  be  as  great as  that of open access  transportation on  U.S. 21-
wholesale  (wellhead,  border  or producer sales)  prices.  U.S.  experience  may 
therefore provide  some  pointers  to  the  maximum  possible effect of  common 
carriage  in Europe,  if it were  to  lead to  much  intensified price 
competition between  gas  producers. 
3.5  The  impact  of open access  transportation in the  U.S.  is considered  in 
Appendix  C.  Direct  comparisons  with  European experience  during  1982-88  are 
rendered more  difficult by  the  extent of U.S.  wellhead price controls, 
especially in the  period through  to  the  end  of 1984.  Around  1982-3, 
average wholesale prices  for  U.S.  gas  were  well  below  European  import 
prices,  although U.S.  import  prices were  actually higher  than  those  of 
imports  into  Europe.  In  1983,  for  example,  average  U.S.  wellhead prices 
were  around  $2. 9_0/mrnBtu  and  average  import prices  about  $5. 35/mmBtu.  By 
1987,  the  average wellhead price had fallen to  a  little under  $1.90/mmBtu 
and  the  average  U.S.  import price to  $2.40/mmBtu,  although  some 
11Spot"  gas 
was  changing hands  at prices  much  lower  than the wellhead average.  For 
comparison,  typical  European  gas  import  prices  in 1987  were  around 
$2.50/mmBtu.  There  is  therefore  some  evidence  that  gas-gas  competition in 
the  U.S.  brought  about  lower  wholesale prices  than would  otherwise  have 
prevailed.  It must,  however,  be  recalled that this  took place  in a 
situation of substantial shut-in production,  many  small  producers  striving 
to market  their output  and  a  high degree  of competition for  business 
between long-distance pipelines.  Thus  conditions  are very different  from 
those prevailing or likely to prevail  in Europe. 
3.6  A number  of other points  from  U.S.  experience  are worth noting:-
(a)  pipeline companies'  trading margins  on  traditional merchanting 
(purchase  and  sale)  activities were  squeezed  somewhat  over  the  period 
1984-88; 
(b)  distribution companies'  margins,  on  the  other hand,  appear  to  have 
been maintained  and  even  increased towards  the  end of  the  period,  as 
City Gate  prices  fell faster  than retail gas  prices  to  final 
consumers; 
(c)  among  final  consumers,  large  industrial  and  (especially)  electric 
utility users  were  the  main beneficiaries  of falling wholesale  gas prices,  while  retail prices  to  smaller residential and  commercial 
customers  fell  much  less  than wholesale  prices; 
(d)  notwithstanding  gas-gas  competition in the  U.S.,  small user  gas 
prices  fell by  much  less  than  competing  gas  oil prices  over  1984-86, 
while  gas  prices  to  larger  consumers  f,ell  no  faster  than  the  price  of 
residual  fuel  oil; 
(e)  average  U.S.  gas  prices  to  industrial  and  power  station users  in 1987 
were  around  $2.90/mmBtu,  somewhat  belmv  the  average  level of large 
user prices  in most  but not all Member  States;  and 
(f)  average  U.S.  gas  prices  for  smaller residential and commercial 
customers  were  $5.17/mmBtu,  below  the  average  price  level  for  such 
consumers  in all Member  States except  Luxembourg  and well  below  the 
average  for  the  European  Community  as  a  whole  (about  $7.00/mmBtu,  net 
of tax). 
3.7  Thus  there  is evidence  to  suggest  that gas-gas  competition in open 
access  transportation allowed  large  consumers  in the  US  to obtain supplies 
on  more  favourable  terms  than  they would  othe~rwise have  done.  There  is, 
however,  little to  support  the  view  that gas··gas  competition allowed retail 
gas  prices  to fall relative  to  the price of alternative  (oil)  fuels. 
Current  European Situation 
3.8  A reduction in border  gas  prices as  a  result of common  carriage is 
only likely to  come  about if the  introduction of such  a  system  leads  to 
more  intense price competition between  gas  producers.  The  current 
situation of very considerable  unsold gas  reserves  internationally and 
under-utilised production and  export facilities  in some  of the  countries 
which  supply  the  European  Community  with  gas  have  led some  observers  to 
suggest that this would  take  place  in Europe,  as  it did with  open access 
transportation in  the  United States.  Algeria.  and  the  Soviet Union,  in 
particular,  could probably  export  much  more  gas  than  they currently do 
without major  investment  in production or export facilities,  provided  thE~ 
facilities are  installed to  take  delivery  in Western  Europe.  The 
additional  export potential  may  currently be  as  much  as  10  bern/a  from  the~ 
USSR  and perhaps  20  bern/a  from  Algeria,  equivalent  to  over  10%  of total 
Community  consumption.  With  investment  in new  export pipelines,  it :Ls clear that  the  USSR,  in particular,  could deliver  far  more  additional  gas 
than this.  Current  excess  export capacity  (which  is not  the  same  thing  as 
excess  deliverability to customers  in the  Community)  has  led some  observers 
to  conclude  that  common  carriage would unleash new  and powerful  forces  of 
competition between  gas  producers  which have  not hitherto arisen.  In its 
simple  form,  this sort of argument  does  not appear  to  us  to be  credible. 
We  can consider it in  two  parts  - first,  the  current European situation 
and,  second,  the  likely impact  of common  carriage. 
3.9  The  key differences between  the  European  supply situation and  that 
which  enabled gas-to-gas  competition to  emerge  in the  US  were  outlined in 
our previous  report  to  the  European  Commission.  Briefly,  the  European 
market  is characterised by:-
(a)  many  fewer  gas  producers/suppliers,  even  in the  gas  producing Member 
States  such  as  the United Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands  and especially 
in those  Member  States with little or no  indigenous  production,  where 
exports  from  four  producing countries  (Netherlands,  Norway,  Algeria 
and  the  USSR)  account  for  a  very  large  share of total gas  supplies; 
(b)  little or no  competition between pipeline  companies  for  long distance 
transportation to particular markets;  and 
(c)  little excess  deliverability  (to customers)  in the  short  term,  which 
contrasts with considerable  spare pipeline capacity in the  US  which 
enabled direct marketing of  the  'gas bubble'  to  develop. 
3.10  Between  the  four  main  gas  producing countries which  supply 
continental Western  Europe,  there  is  a  form  of  limited oligopolistic 
competition,  by  which  none  can afford  to sell gas  at  a  price considerably 
out of line with  the  others  for very  long.  In general,  the  USSR  pitches 
its export  prices  towards  the  bottom of  the  range  for  the other suppliers, 
in order  to  offset any  suspicions  of unreliability in supply  for political 
reasons.  The  Netherlands  has  the  advantages  of reliability,  flexibility 
and proximity,  while  Norway  is  a  fairly high cost producer  in a  favourable 
geo-political position.  Each  has  typically been able  to  command  a  small 
premium  above  Soviet prices.  Algeria has  traditionally pursued  a  hawkish 
line on prices,  relying on political and wider  trade  considerations  to maintain interest in the  importing countries..  Its export prices are 
currently well  above  those  of  the  Netherlands,  for  example.  Of  the  four 
main producers:-
(a)  the  Netherlands'  export  sales volume  is subject to  a  restrained 
depletion policy and  the  country  can export all the  gas  it wants  to 
under existing arrangements; 
(b)  Norway  is facing  a  substantial decline  in exports  to  the  UK  over  the 
next  few  years  and  is keen  to  increase  sales elsewhere.  Recent 
marketing efforts have  involved sales  agreements  with Austria,  Spain 
and  SEP  of  the  Netherlands,  but high production and  transportation 
costs would  make  it difficult for  Norway  to  compete  against more 
aggressive price cutting by  other producers; 
(c)  Algeria is in desperate  need of  increased foreign  exchange  earnings 
and  is known  to be  interested in LNG  sales  to  the  US  or Japan,  in 
addition to  agreements  reached with  ne~r European  importers  such  as 
Greece  and  Turkey.  It has  recently  shetwn  some  flexibility in export 
deals  such as  the  relatively small  peak-shaving  LNG  agreement 
concluded with British Gas,  which  is  re:ported  to  involve  no 
take-or-pay  commitment;  and 
(d)  the  USSR  is also  seeking  to  expand  energy  export  earnings  to boost  a 
flagging  economy  and has  been looking for  new  markets  in Sweden, 
Greece,  Turkey  and  elsewhere.  In some  existing markets,  the  USSR  may 
face  an  informal  ceiling on  its market  share,  although  the practical 
significance of this  remains  unclear. 
3.11  Although  each  producer  is clearly keen  to  maximise  export earnings, 
the  fact  that  each  already has  a  significant market  share  is  a  key 
difference  from  the  US  situation,  where  even  the  largest producing oil 
company  supplies  no  more  than  5%  of the  market.  No  major exporting country 
would wish  to  make  modest  incremental  sales  t1~  the  Community  if the  cost of 
doing  so were  a  substantial  reduction in the  general  level of market 
realisations. 
3.12  It should perhaps  be  noted  that  the  present  gas  supply situation does 
not  preclude  export  discussions  or  agreements  with buyers  other  than  the traditional  gas  transmission  company  buyers.  Among  these  are  the  following 
examples:-
(a)  long-standing  import  contracts between Gasunie  and electricity 
companies  RWE,  VEW  and  EWE  of West  Germany; 
(b)  purchase of Norwegian Statfjord gas  by  BP's  West  German  subsidiary 
Gelsenberg  in the early 1980s,  at a  price  reportedly higher  than  that 
agreed by  the  continental buying consortium  (a base price of 
$5.50/mmBtu,  subsequently renegotiated).  Gelsenberg eventually  found 
they were  without  a  market  for  this  gas  and  resold it to Ruhrgas; 
(c)  purchase  of Norwegian Statfjord gas  by Mobil  AG  of West  Germany  as 
part of the  continental buying consortium; 
(d)  an attempt by Elf Aquitaine  to  purchase Troll/Sleipner gas  from 
Norway  for  CeFeM,  at an offer price reportedly  above  that agreed by 
the  continental buying consortium  in 1986.  This  attempt  was 
ultimately abandoned  in favour  of GdF  on-selling Troll/Sleipner gas 
to  Elf; 
(e)  the  recent  agreement  for  a  2  bern/a direct supply  from  Norway  to  SEP 
of the  Netherlands  for  use  in new  gas-fired power  stations  from 
around  1995-6; 
(f)  a  sales contract signed in 1988  for direct supplies  from  the 
BP-operated Miller field in the  UK  North  Sea  to  the North of Scotland 
Hydro  Electric Board's  (NSHEB's)  Peterhead  Power  Station,  from  around 
1993;  and 
(g)  a  number  of relatively small  scale direct sales  arrangements  from 
offshore  gas  producers  in Italy  (other  than AGIP),  mainly  to  their 
own  downstream  chemical  plants. 
3.13  Most  of  the  arrangements  referred to  above  do  not  involve  any 
transportation of third party  gas  in pipeline  companies'  grids,  but  they 
may  offer limited evidence  as  regards  the  price which  new  gas  buyers  might 
pay  for  gas  sold direct  from  producers via common  carriage.  In fact,  the 
examples  quoted  above  illustrate the  whole  range  of possible  outcomes:-
(a)  both Gelsenberg  and  Elf appear  to  have  been prepared to  pay  more  than 
the  established buyers  in order  to  obtain supplies  for  themselves, 
although neither arrangement  came  to  fruition; (b)  SEP  agreed  to  a  significantly higher initial price with  the 
Norwegians  than  the  level  of  "E"  tariff at that  time  for  sales  to 
power  stations by  Gasunie,  but  secured  indexation to  coal  (rather 
than oil)  prices  which  was  not  then  on  offer  from  Gasunie.  This 
provides  the  possibility of  lower  pricl~S  than  'E'  tariff in the  long 
term if oil prices rise  faster  than coal prices,  as  many  observers 
expect;  and 
(c)  NSHEB  paid a  price  reported  in October  1988  to  be  around 8.5 
3  pencejtherm  (ECU  0.04/m  )  for very sour  gas.  This  allowed  the 
producers  to  avoid  the  costs  of processing required to  sweeten  the 
gas  sufficiently for British Gas  to be  able  to  accept it into its 
grid for  public distribution.  Even  allowing  for  these  costs,  the 
NSHEB  price appears  to be  somewhat  lowE~r  than recent British Gas' 
purchase prices  for  comparable high  load factor associated gas 
supplies.  It may  be  that British Gas  was  reluctant  to  accept  this 
gas  on  the  timescale  required to  ensurE~  timely development  of the 
Miller oil field.  However,  there  is also  a  suggestion that some 
producers  may  be  prepared to  offer keen prices  to  allow gas  to break 
into new  markets. 
3.14  Also  in the  UK,  it is reported that Associated Gas  Supplies  (AGAS), 
an  independent  gas  marketing  company,  has  concluded  the first carriage deal 
with British Gas.  AGAS  will buy  gas  from  UK  producers  and  is seeking to 
sell it on  to high  load factor  industrial  use~rs  (via  common  carriage)  at a 
price below  that  on offer  from  British Gas.  Recent press reports suggest 
an  average  AGAS  selling price of around  26.5p/therm  (ECU  0.14/m3),  which  is 
below current  BG  firm  gas  prices  for all exce!pt  very  large  firm  industrial 
customers.  Any  AGAS  price  advantage  over  BG  is likely to  arise mainly  from 
a  lower  trading margin  rather  than  a  lower  gas  purchase  price,  although  UK 
producers  might  be  prepared  to  offer  somewhat  lower prices for  a  high  load 
factor  supply  to  AGAS  which  would  avoid  the  offshore  capital costs 
necessary for  a  lower  load factor  supply required by  BG. 3.15  This  evidence  is clearly limited and  inconclusive but  there  may  be 
some  tentative general  conclusions  which  can be  drawn  from  it:-
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(a)  new  buyers  are unlikely  to  conclude  arrangements  with significantly 
higher prices  than  those  obtained by  existing transmission companies 
except  in times  of perceived gas  supply shortage  (which  seem unlikely 
to arise for  the  foreseeable  future)  or  in return for  other 
advantages,  such  as  favourable  indexation  terms;  while 
(b)  producers  are unlikely to offer new  buyers  discounted prices unless 
the direct sale offers opportunities  to break into  a  new  market  (such 
as  power  station use  in Member  States where  this  does  not currently 
exist)  or significantly increase  gas  penetration in existing markets. 
We  now  turn to  the  likely impact  of a  common  carriage  system  in the 
Community. 
Impact  of  Common  Carriage 
3.16  Even after  the  event,  comparisons  between  individual direct sales 
agreements  and  transmission companies'  existing purchase  terms  would be 
rendered difficult by  the  fact  that transmission companies  buy  for  a 
mixture  of different markets  (including higher value  domestic  and 
commercial  sales)  and  not  for  a  specific industrial or  power  station use  of 
relatively low value.  Fluctuating prices of alternative fuels  and 
different price  indexation  terms  would  also  make  it difficult to  isolate 
the  impact  of common  carriage  from  general  movements  in  the  gas  market 
which  would  have  occurred  in any  event.  It is particularly difficult to 
make  a  precise quantitative  assessment  in advance  regarding  the  likely 
effect of common  carriage  on  the  general  level  of gas  import prices.  We 
outline below  some  of the key  factors  involved,  in a  qualitative fashion, 
and  illustrate our  conclusions with what  we  consider  to be  a  reasonable 
quantitative example. 
3.17  There  are  a  number  of factors  which  suggest  a  favourable  net  impact 
of common  carriage.  Large,  energy-intensive  industrial users  and  power 
utilities will  be  looking  to cut costs  and are unlikely  to  pay  a  premium 
for direct purchases,  unless  there  are  other offsetting advantages  such  as more  favourable  indexation or  a  considerable  saving  in cost  from  border  to 
delivery point.  Where  major  new  markets  for  gas  emerge  (such  as  efficient 
combined cycle  gas-fired plant  for  power  genE~  ration),  the  direct purchase 
option will  enhance  buyers'  choices,  promote  competition between suppliers 
and help  ensure  that supplies  are  available  on  favourable  terms.  The 
common  carriage option will also  allow end users  to  communicate  more 
directly to  producers  the  opportunities  for selective price reductions  t·o 
induce  load switching  to  gas  from  other  fuels;,  although  transmission 
companies  should generally be  aware  of these  in the  normal  course  of 
events.  A threat of direct sales via common  carriage  may  also place  some 
additional competitive pressure  on  transmission companies  to  ensure  that 
their own  purchases  are  made  on  the best possible  terms. 
3.18  The  main counter-weight  to  this potential for  increased competition 
is the  structure of the  European  gas  market  and  the  attitude of the major 
producers.  Gas  common  carriage is likely to  add new  (potential)  buyers  to 
an oligopolistic market.  This will scarcely make  it perfectly competitive, 
although it may  enhance  sellers'  access  to  some  market sectors.  The  maj c:>r 
gas  producing countries  are  unlikely  to begin competing much  more  fiercely 
for market  share,  without  regard  to  the effect of competitive price cutting 
on market realisations,  simply because  there  are  a  small number  of large 
industrial consumers  seeking  a  gas  supply alongside  their traditional 
utility customers.  They  might  be  prepared  to  make  some  limited price 
concessions where  there are  opportunities  to  enter a  new  market  (such  as 
power  generation in the  UK)  or where  a  large industrial user would  then be 
willing to  switch or  convert  a  substantial  load  (eg for  auto-generation) 
from  another  fuel  to natural  gas.  Nevertheless,  producers  would still bE~ 
conscious  that substantially lower prices  to  direct buyers  could have  a 
~knock-on" effect on  their next  price renegotiation with existing 
purchasers.  Of all  the  gas  producing countries,  the  USSR  (with  its massive 
reserves  and  low  production costs)  is perhaps best placed  to  reduce  price!S 
and  common  carriage  may  offer  the  opportunity  to  circumvent  any  informal 
ceilings  on market  share  observed by  purchasing  transmission companies. 
Yet  the  Soviet Union  has  already demonstrated its skill  in pitching prices 
just slightly below  those  of other producers  in order  to  protect its 
position,  without  triggering off a  competitivE~ price cutting response. 3.19  On  balance,  we  would  expect  the  impact  of  gas  common  carriage  on  the 
border price of  imported  gas  to  be  favourable.  It is also  likely to  have 
some  beneficial effect on  the  costs  of gas  production within  the  Community, 
in the  longer  term.  In quantitative  terms,  however,  we  conclude  that  some 
observers have  exaggerated  the  likely benefits,  often by misplaced analogy 
with recent U.S.  experience.  The  market  and  regulatory conditions  which 
precipitated intense  gas-to-gas  competition  in the  U.S.  simply  do  not exist 
in the  European situation.  We  therefore  take  the view  that  the beneficial 
impact  of gas  common  carriage  on  the  general  level of bulk gas  purchase 
prices  in the  Community  (as  opposed  to  the price  level  in particular direct 
marketing deals)  is likely to  be  fairly modest. 
3.20  A modest  percentage  reduction in gas  purchase  costs nevertheless 
equates  to  a  substantial sum  of money.  DG  XVII's  current projections  show 
around  230  mtoe  (some  270  bern/a)  of gas  consumed  in the  Community  at the 
turn of the century.  At  average  1987  gas  purchase prices of around  ECU 
3  0.08/m  (some  $2.75/mrnBtu),  for  example,  this  implies  a  total annual  gas 
purchase bill of around  ECU  22  billion  (about  $27  billion).  Of  this,  39% 
is projected to  be  incurred as  gas  imports  from  outside  the  Community,  with 
the other  61%  going  in payments  to  indigenous  gas  producers,  especially in 
the  Netherlands  and  the  UK. 
3.21  In commercial  terms,  Community  gas  producers  would probably have  to 
respond  to  any  general  reduction  in imported gas  prices,  in order  to 
maintain their competitive position.  From  an  economic  welfare viewpoint, 
however,  it is principally the  resource  cost of producing gas  within the 
Community  which  is relevant and not  the  level of purchase prices  from 
Community  producers.  In respect of gas  fields  currently in production,  the 
bulk of the  resource  costs have  already been  incurred during construction. 
Reduced  selling prices  from  sue~ fields  would benefit  consumers,  but  may 
not  improve  overall  Community  welfare significantly unless  capital or 
operating costs  are  actually reduced as  well.  Nevertheless,  lower  gas 
prices  from  producing fields  could  have  some  overall  Community  welfare 
benefits if upstream monopoly  profits are  eroded or  the  level of funds 
repatriated  to  non-EC  parent oil companies  is  reduced. 3.22  In order  to  provide  an 
11order of magnitude"  impression of the  impact 
which  common  carriage  might  have,  we  can consider  an  illustrative example 
with  three different elements.  Our  example  assumes: 
(a)  direct buying  by  large  users  via  common  carriage  (on  the  scale set 
out  in Appendix  B)  at a  border price which  is  on  average  5%  below 
that at which  transmission companies  WCJuld  otherwise  have  bought  for 
re-sale,  mainly  reflecting competition between suppliers  for  new  or 
expanding markets  such  as  combined  cycle  power  generation; 
(b)  a  "knock-on"  effect on  the  general  lev~!l of  imported gas  purchase 
prices of 2%.  This  reflects  transmiss:Lon  companies'  response  to  the 
direct sales  threat in large  user markets  (which  are  only part of 
their total sales),  reducing  some  selling prices  and at the  same  time 
seeking concomitant  improvements  in their gas  purchase  terms;  and 
(c)  a  reduction  in the  resource  cost of producing  gas  in the  Community  of 
1%,  mainly  reflecting  lower  capital  and  operating costs  for  new 
fields. 
3.23  The  UK  is excluded  from  the  estimated benefits of a  Community-wide 
carriage  system,  since  there  is already  a  corr~on carriage principle 
enshrined in the national legislation  (1986  Gas  Act)  and  reinforced by 
subsequent measures  taken  in response  to  the  MMC  report of 1988.  A 
Community-wide  move  to  introduce  common  carriage would  therefore  have 
little additional  impact  as  far as  the  UK  is concerned. 
3.24  The  three effects outlined above  can be  quantified for  the  year  2000, 
as  follows:-
(a)  6  bern  (3%  of the  Community  gas  market,  excluding  the  UK)  supplied 
from  non-Member  States via common  carriage at a  reduction of  5%  on  an 
average  price of  ECU  0.08/m3  would  cut  the  Community's  gas  import 
bill by  around  ECU  25  million per  annum  (providing that it does  not 
put existing importers  into  irrecoverable  take-or-pay penalties); 
(b)  a  general  2%  reduction  in the  price of other  gas  imports  (95  bern) 
would  reduce  the  annual  import bill by  iECU  150  million;  and 37 
(c)  a  1%  reduction in the  resource  cost of non-UK  Community  gas 
production  (98  bern)  would  provide  a  benefit of approximately  ECU  80 
million per year. 
3.25  It should be  emphasised  that this  is merely an illustrative example, 
but in our  view  a  not unreasonable  one.  The  economic  cost of natural  gas 
to  the  Community  would,  on  this basis,  be  reduced by  around  ECU  250  million 
per annum,  equivalent  to  about  1.2%  of the  current Community  gas  purchase 
bill.  Even  allowing for  a  fairly wide  margin of error in our assumptions, 
it seems  plausible  to  conclude  that the benefit is most  likely to  lie 
within a  range  of perhaps  ECU  150-350 million p.a. 
3.26  This  result  assumes  that current  'buyer's market'  conditions  continue 
to prevail  in the  European  gas  industry.  In a  'seller's market'  of 
perceived gas  supply shortage  (which  we  consider unlikely  to  recur  for  the 
foreseeable  future),  the  introduction of additional buyers via common 
carriage might  exacerbate  a  tendency  to  'bid up'  gas  purchase  prices.  This 
tendency was  evident,  for  example,  in the  early 1980's  when  the original 
Norwegian Statfjord deal was  concluded. "38 
IV  GAS  INDUSTRY  EFFICIENCY 
Introduction 
4.1  The  second effect of gas  common  carriage which we  have  been asked  to 
consider  in this  report  is its  impact  on  the  efficiency of gas  transmission 
and distribution operations within the  Community.  Recent  reductions  in 1:he 
level of gas  purchase  costs  since  1986  mean  that non-gas  costs have  .assurned 
an increasing  importance  in proportionate  terms.  As  shown  in Section II,. 
they  typically account  for  around  50%  of total  gas  supply costs  for 
domestic  and commercial  users,  but  a  much  low·er  proportion  (typically, 
10-20%)  for  large  industrial  and electric utility consumers.  Over  and 
above  this,  transmission costs  outside  the borders  of the  importing country 
account  for  a  significant proportion of the border price  in some  cases, 
such as  Soviet exports  to  France  or  future  Norwegian exports  to  Spain,  for 
example.  The  impact  of common  carriage on non-gas  costs  should not, 
therefore,  be  ignored. 
4.2  Even  if common  carriage were  to  have  no  beneficial effect on border 
prices  (which  we  consider unlikely),  it could allow  some  large users  to 
undercut  the  gross  trading margins  of existing transmission company 
suppliers,  where  those  trading margins  currently reflect an element of 
monopoly profit.  If this  occurs,  there  could be  three main effects:-
(a)  a  distributional  impact  (welfare  transft:!r  to  large  gas  consumers  from 
gas utilities or,  possibly,  from  other consumers)  discussed in 
Section V below; 
(b)  a  resource  allocation benefit,  from  bringing industrial gas  prices 
closer  to  an  'economic'  level  free  of monopolistic  distortions;  and 
(c)  an  economic  benefit,  to  the  extent  that  gas  utilities respond  to 
competitive  pressure  on  their margins  by  cutting the  resource  cost 
(capital  and operating costs)  of  transmission and distribution within 
the  Community. 
It is  the  last of these  three effects  on which  we  focus  in this section of 
the  report. 4.3  Again,  it must  be  recalled that  a  large part of  the  cost of 
transmission and  distribution comprises  sunk capital costs,  in existing 
pipeline and  storage  facilities.  The  efficiency effect of common  carriage 
on non-gas  costs  therefore  depends  on:-
(a)  reducing  the  operating costs  of existing facilities where,  for 
example,  monopoly  positions  may  have  allowed  labour costs  to  increase 
above  a  market  level; 
(b)  reducing  the capital and operating costs of new  facilities  through 
more  cost-effective design,  improved construction methods  and  the 
elimination of  ngold-plating";  or 
(c)  reducing unit costs  through  the  more  effective utilisation of 
existing facilities. 
4.4  The  quantitative  importance  of these  effects depends  on  a 
relationship between  increased competition  (via  common  carriage)  and 
efficiency.  One  way  of assessing whether  increased competition  (via  common 
carriage)  would  lead  to  greater efficiency in transmission and distribution 
is to consider whether  there  is any  relationship between  the  degree  of 
competition which various  gas utilities already face,  from  other fuels,  and 
the  level of their non-gas  costs.  There  are  two  ways  in which  this might 
be  considered,  as  follows:-
(a)  cross-sectional  comparisons  between  gas utilities at a  point  in  time; 
or 
(b)  time  series analysis  of a  given utility's costs  over  a  period of 
time. 
Each  of these  is addressed  in  turn below. 
Cost  Comparisons 
4.5  As  shom1  in Section II,  the  level and structure of non-gas  costs 
varies  considerably as  between Member  States.  Non-gas  costs  tend  to  be 
lowest  in the  Netherlands  and  highest  in countries  such  as  Spain and  Italy, 
especially at the  distribution level.  This  does  not necessarily mean  that the  former  is  much  more  efficient than  the  latter.  In providing a 
distribution grid to  serve  smaller consumers,  there  is a  large cost element 
which  is essentially fixed,  regardless  of  thE~  density of connections  on 
that grid.  Moreover,  the  costs  of providing a  network with higher  capacity 
rise much  less  than  in proportion  to  increasing average  consumption per 
customer.  There  is  therefore  a  strong  tendency  for unit distribution costs 
to fall with  increasing penetration of domestic  and  commercial  networks  by 
natural  gas  and  increasing use  of gas  for  central heating,  in particular, 
since  this brings with it a  significant incre!ase  in average  consumption. 
4.6  There  are also  a  number  of reasons  why  non-gas  costs may  vary  betW4~en 
countries at  the  level  of  transmission and  storage,  such  as  geographical 
size and  the  availability of relatively low cost underground storage.  For 
these  reasons,  we  consider  that it is not meaningful  to  equate  relative 
non-gas  cost levels  among  gas utilities with differences  in efficiency,  nor 
to  try and relate these  costs differences  to  the  degree  of competition 
faced  in the  gas  market  by  each utility. 
Competition  and  Efficiency 
4.7  Having  examined  and  rejected the  possibility of meaningful 
comparisons  of non-gas  costs between utilities,  we  now  turn  to  trends  in 
individual utilities'  costs  over  time.  With  the fall  in oil product  pric:es 
from  late  1985  (in the  case  of heavy  fuel  oil)  and early 1986  (in the  case 
of heating oil),  gas  companies  across  Europe  have  faced  increasing 
competitive pressure  from  oil  in most  markets,  especially as  regards  sales 
to  industrial users.  If competitive  pressure  from  the  threat of common, 
carriage would bring efficiency benefits,  then  we  would  expect  to  see  some 
evidence  of  improved  efficiency  in  the  light of increased competition  from 
oil.  Unfortunately,  the  information available  (for  the years  1982-87)  is 
rather  limited for  a  full  and  fair test of this hypothesis.  In particular, 
any efficiency  improvements  are  likely to  take  place  gradually over  a 
period of years.  The  limited available evidence  may  nevertheless  cast  some 
light on  the  efficiency question and  we  have  therefore  examined  trends  in 
non-gas  costs for  a  number  of major  European  gas  utilities,  compared with 
trends  in  the  competitive  position of natural  gas  versus  oil. 4.8  Table  4.1  summarises  the  results obtained  from  an  examination of real 
unit non-gas  costs  and  their relationship  (if any)  to  relative  gas  and oil 
prices.  The  gas/oil relative price  index was  constructed by  using 
industrial gas  and heavy  fuel oil prices  (in ECU/GJ),  then converting the 
ratio into  an  index using  1985  as  the  base  year.  The  non-gas  cost  index 
was  constructed using data derived  from  annual  reports;  these costs were 
then deflated and  turned  into an  index. 
4.9  As  can be  seen in Table  4.1,  the  rapid fall  in oil prices  over 
1985/86  made  gas  appear  uncompetitive  in all of the  seven countries 
considered.  However,  as  the  index of non-gas  costs  shows,  this did not 
necessarily produce  a  reduction  in utility costs  to  improve  the  competitive 
position.  In Italy,  West  Germany  and  the  UK,  unit non-gas  costs  increased, 
which may  reflect the  volume  effect of losing interruptible gas  consumers 
to oil.  By  1987  as  gas  prices fell  to  a  more  competitive  level,  only  the 
Dutch  and  Spanish utilities managed  to  continue  to  reduce  their non-gas 
costs.  In Belgium  and  Italy,  for  example,  utility non-gas  costs  rose 
considerably. 
4.10  Figure 4.1  shows  the  actual  observations  for all of the  Member  States 
considered,  together with  a  line  of best fit.  The  regression line suggests 
that there is a  general  tendency  for  real non-gas  costs  to be  lower  in 
years  when  gas  prices  are  high  relative to  those  of oil,  and  gas utilities 
come  under  increasing competitive  pressure.  However,  as  Figure 4.1 clearly 
highlights,  the  relationship is not  a  very strong or consistent one.  The 
most  likely reason  for  this  is that efficiency can only be  improved  in 
response  to  increased competition over  a  period of years;  we  do  not yet 
have  sufficient data  to  capture  the  full  response  to  falling oil prices 
from  1985-86. 
Impact  of  Common  Carriage 
4.11  Having  reviewed  the  evidence  for  a  general  link between  the  extent of 
competition and  efficiency,  we  now  turn  to  the  impact  of common  carriage, 
in particular.  In our view,  a  common  carriage  system would provide  a  much 
more  considerable  competitive  threat at  the  level of transmission  than at T
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J
 the  level of distribution.  Only  in Member  States  where  there  are 
significant  industrial customers  supplied by  local distributors  (such  as 
Denmark  and West  Germany)  is  there  a  possibility that transmission 
companies  might  "cherry pick"  attractive loads by direct sales  through  the 
distribution grid,  using common  carriage.  In general,  local distributors 
who  supply only smaller domestic  and  commercj~al customers  are unlikely  to 
be  subject to  any significant increase  in thE!  degree of competition they 
face.  It therefore  seems  to us  that  the majc)r  part of any efficiency 
benefits will be  felt at the  level of transmission and storage,  rather than 
local distribution. 
4.12  In 1987,  the  (weighted)  average  level  c1f  transmission and  storage 
costs  across  the Member  States examined  in Section II  (excluding for  this 
purpose  the  UK,  which  already has  common  carriage legislation)  was  around 
ECU  0.022/m3  (some  $0.80/mmBtu).  Assuming  that the  1987  cost structure  :is 
broadly maintained  (in real  terms)  to  the year  2000  and  that cost levels 
are or will be  comparable  for  the  Member  States not examined  in detail 
(Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  Portugal),  the  total gas 
transmission and  storage  gas  cost incurred within  the  Community  (again 
excluding  the  UK)  would be  around  ECU  5  billion in that year.  In practice, 
the  total cost might  be  somewhat  greater  than this,  since unit storage 
costs,  in particular,  will  tend to  increase  over  time  as  average 
consumption  load factors  fall  and  the  seasonal flexibility available  frorn 
old fields  (such  as  Groningen)  diminishes  over  time.  Efficiency 
improvements  appear  to  be  feasible  and  common  carriage  seems  likely to 
provide  a  greater competitive  spur  to  achieve:  them,  since it will put 
pressure  on  transmission company  margins  on  firm  industrial sales which 
face  relatively limited inter-fuel competitio,n.  On  the  other hand,  the 
most  significant non-gas  cost reductions  are  to be  had  from  increased sales 
volumes  and greater market penetration.  Common  carriage per se  is likely 
to  make  only  a  modest  contribution in this  regard.  Nevertheless,  if the 
competitive  threat implicit in a  common  carriage  system  induces  only  a  5~ 
improvement  in transmission level efficiency by  2000,  then an  economic 
benefit  to  the  Community  of  some  ECU  250  p.a.  would  result. 45 
V  INCOME  DISTRIBUTION  EFFECTS 
Introduction 
5.1  The  third element  of  the  common  carriage effects which  we  have  been 
asked to  consider  in this report  is  the possible redistribution of  income 
between  gas  companies  and  consumers,  or between different classes of 
consumers.  If a  large  gas  consumer  decides  to  purchase  gas  direct  from  a 
producer via common  carriage,  then the  impact  on its existing transmission 
company  supplier could consist of three main elements:-
(a)  a  direct loss of sales  and sales  revenue  if existing customers  are 
'captured'  by direct sales competition,  together with  a  gain  in 
income  from  carriage charges  which may  or may  not offset the  loss of 
sales  revenues; 
(b)  an  indirect loss of revenue,  if the  threat of competition via common 
carriage leads  gas  companies  to offer their large existing customers 
more  favourable  price  terms;  and 
(c)  a  possible  take-or-pay cost  incurred under  gas  purchase  contracts,  if 
the  loss of sales  causes  a  transmission company  to  take  less  than  the 
contracted  'minimum bill'  purchase quantities. 
5.2  If a  transmission company  is worse  off as  a  result of the  three 
factors  outlined above,  then it may  seek  to pass  the  additional cost on  to 
its distribution company  buyers  or  (in the  case  of British Gas  or GdF)  its 
own  domestic  and  commercial  customers.  Its ability to do  so will  depend  on 
a  number  of factors,  including:-
(a)  the  regulatory regime  (if any)  in place at the national  level, 
governing  transmission company  sales  to distribution companies  or 
sales  to  smaller  domestic  and  commercial  consumers;  and 
(b)  where  sales  terms  from  transmission companies  to distributors  are not 
directly regulated  (West  Germany),  the  relative negotiating strengths 
of  the  two  parties  and  the  attitude of  the  competition authorities. 
5.3  For  the  purposes  of our analysis,  we  assume  that regulators  and 
competition authorities will not,  in the  long  run,  wish  to  see  transmission companies  driven into  a  loss-making position as  a  result of common 
carriage.  We  therefore  make  the  presumption that:-
(a)  transmission companies  making  'above-n()rmal'  profits will  themselves 
have  to  absorb  any  loss  of profitability arising from  common 
carriage;  while 
(b)  those  already earning less  than  a  'normal'  profit would be  allowed  to 
pass  on extra costs  to  their remaining customers. 
5.4  The  definition of  'normal'  profit is dlscussed  in more  detail  belo·~~r. 
First,  we  consider what  might  constitute  a  'fair'  carriage charge  and  the 
impact which  common  carriage at  'fair'  rates would have  on  the  financial 
position of the  main  transmission companies  concerned.  We  make  the 
assumption that carriage charges  would,  in the  first instance,  be 
negotiated between  the  grid owner  and  the  thi.rd party shipper,  but that 
there would be  a  system of appeal  to  the  responsible authorities  in the 
event of alleged abuse  of a  dominant position by  the  grid owner.  In such 
instances,  we  assume  that  the  authorities would have  the  power  to arbitrate 
and set a  'fair'  carriage  charge,  which we  de: fine  as: -
(a)  one  which yields  a  'normal'  return on capital employed for  the grid 
owner;  and 
(b)  one  which  charges  the  third party no  more  than  a  proportionate share 
of  the  costs  which  the  grid owning  company  notionally  'charges' 
itself for  its own  sales  to  comparable  customers. 
'Fair'  Carriage  Charges 
5.5  For  simplicity,  we  assume  that  the  use  of common  carriage which  takes 
place by  2000  (as  outlined in Section III)  involves  high  load factor 
transportation,  without  any  significant need  for  storage  services  from  the 
grid owner.  In practice,  we  believe  that most direct sales would  involve 
high load factor  consumers,  although  some  firm  gas  buyers with no  installed 
capacity to burn alternative  fuels  might  require  a  'back-up'  service which 
might call on  the  grid owner's  storage  capacity  in  the  event of disruption 4t 
to  the direct supply.  While  storage costs  do  vary considerably between 
Member  States,  the  costs of long distance  transportation (in ECU/m3/km,  for 
example)  will  tend to be  much  more  comparable  from  one  location to  another, 
subject  to differences  in terrain,  pipeline capacity and other grid 
operating conditions.  There  would  in practice be variations  in 'fair' 
carriage charges  from  case  to case;  for  the  purposes  of illustration, 
however,  we  consider  typical average  figures.  We  first discuss  the 
question of rates  for  firm carriage;  interruptible  transportation is also 
conceivable and we  return to  this possibility below. 
5.6  There  are  a  number  of clues  as  to what  might  constitute a  typical 
'fair'  carriage charge  for  firm  transportation.  In its 1986  statement of 
guidance  for  those  seeking  common  carriage  transportation,  British Gas 
quoted figures  of  3.5 pjtherm and  4.0 p/therrn  (around  ECU  0.018/m3  and  ECU 
0.021/m3  respectively)  for  conveyance at 60%  and  90%  load factors  over 
distances of around  300  km.  The  lower  of these  figures  represents  ECU 
0.00006 per m3  per kilometre.  These  quotes  cover  transportation through 
the British Gas  regional  transmission system  (at medium  pressure)  as  well 
as  through  the national high pressure  transmission grid.  From  the  1988  MMC 
report,  it appears  that regional  and national  transmission each  account  for 
about half of the  proposed  total charge.  The  figures  also  include  a  profit 
element  and it must be  recalled that actual carriage charges  can be  (and 
have  been)  appealed  to  the  regulatory body  OFGAS  for  a  decision.  This 
means  that the  charges  actually paid by  third parties might  be  somewhat 
below  the  levels  quoted by  BG. 
5.7  Further evidence  is provided by  the  cost of the  MEGAL  pipeline,  which 
carries  Soviet gas  from  the Austrian/West German  border across  West  Germany 
and  into France.  The  line  is reported to have  carried 800  million kWh 
(some  75  million m3)  of natural  gas  per day  in 1985,  over an  average 
distance of 400  km.  Its capital cost is said to have  been  DM  2.1 billion 
(around  ECU  1  billion),  which  might  equate  to  some  ECU  1.3 billion at 
today's  (1989)  costs  and prices.  If this capital cost is amortised over  a 
30  year pipeline life at  5%  (real return on capital),  it is equivalent to 
around  ECU  85  million per year.  Assuming  that gas  used for  compression 
amounts  to  2%  of the  total volume  carried,  this element of operating costs 
could be  as  much  as  ECU  40  million per year.  Other operating costs  are 48 
likely to  be  relatively minor,  perhaps  ECU  20  million per year  to cover 
maintenance,  equipment  and  labour costs.  These  costs  suggest a  total 
transmission cost of  ECU  145  million per annum,  equivalent  to  ECU  0.005/m3 
($0.16/mmBtu)  transported at 1985  volumes.  This  corresponds  to just ECU 
0. 000013/m3  /km,  which  is only just over  20%  c,f  the British Gas  rate  on an 
equivalent  ECU/m3/km  basis.  This  reflects  the purely high-pressure 
trunkline nature of MEGAL,  with a  large  capac~ity and  limited 
inter-connections,  as  compared with  the higher unit cost of operating a 
complex grid with many  offtake points.  It is also worth noting that  BG'  ~s 
publicly quoted figure  may  be  "regulated downwards"  in cases  referred to 
OFGAS.  Even  if direct purchases via common  c:arriage  are  limited to large, 
high  load factor  customers  taking gas at high pressure,  the  total unit  cc:>st 
of transmission from  border  to plant gate  is likely to be  substantially 
greater  than the  cost of transportation in a  trunkline  such  as  MEGAL. 
5.8  A further  indication of a  'fair'  transmission charge  can be  obtained 
from  Gasunie's  accounts,  since  the  company  does  not  seek to make  anything 
3  more  than a  normal  profit and  its unit non-gas  costs of  ECU  0.004/m  are 
very close  to  a  pure  transmission cost.  Assuming  that the  average  distance 
over which natural  gas  is transported by Gasunie  is 100  kilometres,  this 
equates  to  ECU  0.00004/m3/km.  This  is  somewhat  below  the  BG  quote but well 
above  the  estimated MEGAL  transportation cost:.  Gas  is  transported within 
the Netherlands at relatively low  load factors  (only around 40%)  and  the 
unit  transmission cost would be  significantly lower at a  high pipeline  load 
factor.  On  the  other hand,  replacement cost accounting and  a  full 
commercial  profit element  would  considerably increase  transmission costs,, 
as  compared with  the  figure  obtained directly from  Gasunie' s  Annual  Repo1~t. 
5.9  We  have  also  examined  the  transportation rate schedules  of U.S. 
pipeline companies  for  a  firm  transportation service.  Given  the fact  that 
a  number  of inter-state trunklines  do  not have  many  offtake points  along 
their length,  transportation charges  in the U.S.  are  typically "postage 
stamp"  rates which  are  fixed  irrespective of distance.  We  have,  however, 
found  three  examples  of distance-related charges,  as  follows:-
.... Table  5.1:  Illustrative U.S.  Firm Transportation Rates.  1989 
us  S/mmBtu/mile*4  US  S/mmBtu  3  ECU/m  /km 
ANR  Pipeline  Co*l  0.00181  0.54  0.000036 
Natural  Gas  Pipeline  Co  of 
America *2  0.00065  0.19  0.000013 
Northern Natural  Gas 
Company  *3  0.00150  0.45  0.000030 
*1  Maximum  Rate,  Mainline Access  plus Mainline Mileage  charges 
*2  Southern Zone,  Maximum  Peak Rate,  Reservation Charge  plus  Commodity 
Charge 
*3  Field-Market,  Reservation Fee  plus  Commodity  Rate  plus Mileage 
(Maximum  Charges) 
*4  Based on a  distance of  300  miles 
We  have  taken maximum  transportation rates  in each  case,  which  are 
typically based on full average cost;  in practice,  competition between 
pipelines is such that lower  rates are  often negotiated.  Rates  clearly 
vary  from pipeline  to pipeline,  but it is interesting that  two  out of the 
three  companies  examined have  maximum  firm  transportation rates which  are 
similar to  the  cost of ECU  0.00004/m3/km  estimated from  the Gasunie 
accounts.  It should also be  recalled that long distance pipeline 
construction costs  may  be  lower  in parts of the  U.S.  than  in Europe,  due  to 
lower population densities. 
5.10  The  total length of  the  transmission network varies considerably 
between Member  States  and  this would  tend to produce  different transmission 
costs per m3,  even if the  cost per m3/km  were  uniform across  the  Community. 
As  of 1986,  the  position was  as  shown  in Table  5.2  below:-Table  5.2:  Total  Length  of Transmission Pipelines.  1986 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
West  Germany 
United Kingdom 
*1987 
km 
3,387 
27,392 
20,156 
5,750 
1,581* 
51,500 
17,702 
Consumption  (mtoe)* 
7.5 
25.3 
33.0 
33.6 
2.8 
44.8 
48.9 
50 
It can be  seen  from  this  table  that  there  is  a  broad correlation between 
length of system  and  consumption,  with  the notable exceptions  of the 
Netherlands  and  the  UK,  which both have  short  transmission grids  in 
relation to market  size.  In  the  UK,  in particular,  this reflects  the very 
extensive distribution grid and  the  fact  that even quite large  consumers 
are  often supplied at the distribution level.  Table  5.2  does  not take  into 
account the ·average  capacity of  transmission lines in each Member  State, 
but this  information  taken together with country size and  the physical 
configuration of the  grid provides  some  clues as  to  the  average  distance 
over which  gas  is  transported in each  case. 
5.11  As  noted above,  carriage  charges  would  be  negotiated individually and 
assessed on  a  case-by-case basis by  the  competent  European Community 
authorities in the  event of alleged abuse  of dominant positions.  There 
would no  doubt  be variations  in the  'fair'  level of charges  from  one 
situation to  another.  For  the  purposes  of illustration,  however,  we  have 
assumed  an average  carriage  charge  for high  load factor  firm  transportati.on 
of  ECU  0.00005/m3/km.  This  is equivalent to  ECU  0.005/m3  ($0.19/mmBtu)  for 
transportation over  100  kilometres,  which  we  have  taken  to be  the  average: 
transmission distance  in  the  Netherlands.  In Spain,  however,  the  early 
stages of gas  industry development  and  low  grid utilisation are  such  that 
we  have  assumed  a  higher figure  of  ECU  0.008/m3.  Assumptions  are  also 
required for  the  average  distance  over which  gas  is transported by 
transmission companies  in other Member  States.  These  take  into  account  the 
fact  that  the  transmission companies  sometimes  take  delivery of imported 
(eg Soviet)  gas  at a  point outside  their own  borders  and are  then 
responsible  for  transit transportation costs  as well  as  in-country 6i 
transportation.  We  can  then derive  estimates of  'fair'  average  unit 
charges  for high  load factor  firm  transportation in each  Member  State. 
These  are  compared with our estimates of the  transmission companies'  gross 
trading margins  on  1987  firm sales to  industrial/power station consumers, 
in Table  5.3 below:-
Table  5.3:  'Fair'  Firm Transportation Charges*  and  Firm Sales  Margins 
(in ECU/m3,  x  100) 
Assumed  Average 
Distance  (km) 
'Fair'  Firm 
Transmission Charge 
Average Distribution 
Charge** 
Total  'Fair' 
Transportation Charge 
1987  Gross  Margin*** 
(Firm  Ind/Power Sales) 
80 
0.4 
0.4 
0.9 
I 
250  350  100 
1.3  1.8  0.5 
1.7  1.8  0.5 
1.2  3.2  0.7 
*  defined as set out  in paragraph 5.4 above. 
300  350  200 
2.4  1.8  1.0 
4.4  3.1  2.2 
9.3  6.4  7.0 
**  a  distribution cost element  is  included where  a  proportion of firm 
industrial  consumers  are  located on  the distribution grid. 
***  average  firm  gas  selling price  to  industrial/power station consumers 
minus  average  cost of gas  purchases.  Assumed  selling prices are set out  in 
Appendix A  (Table  A9). 52-
5.12  In  interpreting Table  5.3,  it should be  borne  in mind  that  the 
averagEJJ)g~Qss::;~tadl\rtg'~margins  for  1987  reLate  to  total firm  industrial and 
powet:'r;ptaneue!uS~tOmttrs,  some  of whom  take  gas  on  a  lower  load factor  and 
.i.maose':o:Stgnt:fi:cant c:'Sto·rage  costs ~on the  transmission companies  concerned  . 
.  1heJO:e;;~irs.;  moreover,. ::a  substantial cost .of strategic storage  for  the 
maintenance  of supply security in Member  States  such as  France  and Italy. 
By  contrast,  we  have  assumed  that  the  consumers  seeking  to buy direct via 
co~Q]!,~~ri~ge, at  .. a  "fair"  charge will only require  transmission and not 
storage.  It is also probable  that  the  large,  high  load factor  firm  gas 
users>who  might consiqer direct purchases already buy  gas at a  price below 
the  average  figures  on which  our estimates of gross  margins  are based.  Our 
estimates may  therefore exaggerate  the  gains  to be  had  for most  large 
consumers  in direct purchases via common  carriage.  Nevertheless,  it 
appears  that a  'fair'  carriage  charge  for  large,  high load factor  consumers 
might  undercut current  transmission company  gross  margins  on  firm sales to 
some  large users  in most  Member  States.  This effect would be  most  marked 
in Spain,  West  Germany  and  the  UK. 
5.13  The  foregoing analysis was  based on  firm carriage  to high load factor 
consumers.  A further possibility is transportation which would be 
interruptible at the option of the  pipeline owner,  particularly where  the 
final  consumer has  the  option of switching to alternative  fuels  at short 
notice.  Interruptible  transportation could be relatively cheap  if the 
third party shipper  does  not bear  the  full capacity costs appropriate  to 
firm  transportation.  It could also be valuable  to  the  transmission grid 
owner,  since it would  release capacity and  gas  supplies  for  the  owner's  o·wn 
firm  gas  sales  in peak periods  when  carriage  :ls  interrupted.  This  would 
therefore  allow  the  transmission  company  to  economise  on storage 
facilities.  Interruptible transportation is  common  in the U.S.  and 
generally  takes place at a  simple  commodity  rate,  with no  capacity charges. 
In general,  negotiated interruptible  transport:ation rates are significantly 
lower  than  those  for  a  firm  transportation service. 
5.14  The  low  cost of  interruptible carriage  i.s  also  likely to hold  true  :i.n 
Europe.  For  example,  the  MMC  report  on British Gas  quotes  incremental 
transmission  and distribution costs  for  new  interruptible users  of just 0.3 
p/therm  (ECU  0.0015/m3),  as  compared with  2.3  p/therm  (ECU  O.Olljm3)  for 53 
new  firm  industrial sales.  A number  of the  large  consumers  who  might be 
interested in direct supplies via common  carriage could switch to 
alternative fuels at short notice and  this suggests  that  they might  see  a 
commercial  advantage  in interruptible carriage deals.  To  the  extent that 
transmission companies  currently get  a  substantial contribution to  their 
fixed non-gas  costs  from  interruptible sales which  a  'fair'  interruptible 
carriage charge would erode,  such arrangements  could also have  consequences 
for  the distribution of  income  between utilities,  large users  and smaller 
gas  consumers. 
5.15  In Table  5.4 below,  we  set out  a  similar analysis  to  that presented 
in Table  5.3,  but this  time  for  'fair'  interruptible carriage charges  and 
gross  trading margins  on  interruptible sales  to  large consumers  in 1987. 
This  assumes  that 'fair'  interruptible carriage charges  do  not  include  a 
substantial contribution to capacity costs  and are set at one-third of  the 
firm  transportation charges  shown  in Table  5.3,  to  cover  the cost of 
compression and other variable operating costs. 
Table  5.4:  'Fair'  Interruptible Transportation Charges  and  Interruptible 
Sales Margins 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
West  Germany 
United Kingdom 
(in ECUJm3,  x  100) 
'Fair'  Charge  Gross  Margin,  1987 
(Interruptible Transportation)  (Interruptible Sales) 
0.13  (1.0) 
0.42  (1.0) 
0.58  1.4 
0.17  -** 
0.80  3.2 
0.58  1.1 
0. 50*  (0.1) 
*  includes  a  distribution cost element,  as  some  interruptible customers 
are  located on  the distribution grid. 
**  power  station sales only;  estimated gross  margin  is zero. 5.16  This  table  suggests  that a  'fair'  interruptible carriage charge  might 
·uriilertutr.cutrefit  dtoss·margins  on  interruptible sales to  large users  in 
West  C~rmany  ;·  Italy and  Spain.  In  the  other Member  States,  the 
· transmfs·sion company's  gross  margin  (average  interruptible selling price 
'minus ·S.vera:ge  gas  purchase cost)  appears  to have  been zero  or negative  i.n 
~1987. 
1  This  Appears  to  reflect the  more  intense  competition which  gas  faces 
from ·oil products  in'the interruptible market,  leading to  lower 
t'tari·smtssion company  trading margins  than  those  earned on sales  to  firm 
industrial  cottsuDiers  whose  alternative fuel  options  are  more  remote. 
Impact of Common  Carriage 
5.17  As  ou'tlined in the  introduction to  this Section,  transmission 
cOmpanies' could suffer a  direct reduction in profit if carriage charges  do 
not:cotnpens.S.te  them  for  the  merchanting  (purc::hase  and re-sale)  margin lost 
"when'existing customers  enter into direct purchase contracts.  This  could 
arise where ·a  reasonable  carriage  charge  is less  than the  transmission 
company's  gross  merchanting margin.  Direct marketing  is most  likely to be 
directed towards  high  margin  customers  and  those  favourably  located to  buy 
direct,  with only  a  short distance  over which  the direct gas  supply has  to 
be  transported. 
5.18  The  second effect  to be  considered is transmission companies'  likely 
response  to  the  threat of competition via  con~on carriage,  in terms  of 
offering more  favourable  terms  to  large  customers  in an attempt  to  retain 
load.  This  effect is likely to be  most  apparent  in Member  States where 
current  trading margins  exceed  the  probable  level of a  fair carriage 
charge.  On  the basis  of Table  5.3,  we  would  expect  the  transmission 
companies  in Italy,  West  Germany  and  the  UK  to  come  under most  competitive 
pressure  for  sales  to  large users  in the  firm gas market.  In the 
interruptible market,  the  companies  in Italy and West  Germany  appear  to 
face  the  greatest threat  from direct sales competition via interruptible 
transportation.  The  utilities concerned might  therefore offer  improved 
sales  terms  to  their customers,  in an attempt  to  ward off this  competitive 
threat.  Our  estimates  also  suggest  that reasonable carriage charges  might 
put  ENAGAS  margins  under  considerable pressure  in Spain;  in the  immediate 
future,  however,  a  reasonable  charge  may  well be  even higher  than we  have 
assumed,  given substantial financing costs  and  low grid utilisation. 5.19  A significant potential problem for  some  transmission companies  is 
the  threat of purchase  contract  take-or-pay penalties.  Utilities such  as 
Gaz  de  France  and  (particularly)  Distrigaz,  are  already at or near  the 
'minimum bill'  level of offtakes under  their purchase contracts.  Demand 
growth prospects  in Belgium and  France  are  perhaps  less promising  than in 
some  other Member  States.  A modest  reduction  in total sales might 
therefore be  sufficient to push  them  into  take-or-pay penalties,  if they 
they are not able  to  renegotiate  the  relevant contract terms,  nor  to 
re-sell their contracted surplus outside  their  own  supply areas.  If,  for 
example,  the  Distrigaz  take-or-pay position has not  improved by  2000  and  3% 
of the market  is lost to direct marketing via common  carriage,  the  company 
might  then have  to  pay up  to around  ECU  23  million per annum  for  gas 
contracted b~t not taken under its purchase  contracts. 
5.20  For  the  purposes  of assessment,  we  assume  that most of the direct 
sales  taking place  in 2000  will require  firm  transportation and  that 
relatively few  direct sales are  made  via interruptible carriage.  This 
assumption reflects relatively high  transmission company  margins  on  firm 
industrial sales,  which  may  stimulate greater interest in direct purchases 
among  firm  gas  users,  as  well as  the  greater complexity of concluding 
innovative  interruptible transportation arrangements  of a  type  largely 
unknown  in Europe. 
5.21  In Table  5.5  below,  we  present  our estimates  of  the  three 
redistribution effects of common  carriage,  as  follows: 
(a)  the direct effect of losing market  share  to direct sales competition, 
partially offset by  income  from  'fair'  carriage charges; 
(b)  the  indirect effect on  realisations  from  large user markets;  and 
(c)  the  take-or-pay effect,  where  relevant. 
The  estimated magnitude  of the  direct and  take-or-pay effects  is based on 
the  assumed  level of common  carriage  in 2000,  as  set out  in Appendix  B. 
Table  5.5  shows  the  initial impact  on  transmission companies,  before 
allowing for  the  fact  that some  of  the  increased costs might  be  passed on 
to  other gas  consumers.  The  table  does,  however,  take  account of the 
benefits  to  transmission companies  of greater efficiency and  somewhat  lower 
gas  purchase  costs  in a  more  competitive  environment,  as  discussed earlier 
in the  report. Table  5.5:  Initial  lmeact  of  Common  Carriage on  Transmission  Comeanies 
(Year  2000,  figures  in  ECU  million p.a.) 
!  f.  l  !1.  if  ill  Y! 
Firm  carriage  (bcm)  0.2  0.7  1.8  0.9  0.17  1.9  4.2 
Interr carriage  (bcm)  0.6  0.06  0.2 
Direct  effect *  firm  ( 1)  3  (25)  (2)  (8)  (63)  (204) 
Direct  effect  interr  (  5)  ( 1 )  (1) 
lndi rect  effect **  - firm  (72)  ( 19)  (120>  (113) 
Indirect  effect  .  interr  (67)  (15)  (32) 
Take· or-pay  (23)  (69) 
Efficiency gain  5  33  93  8  11  80  68 
Gas  cost  reduction  ..ll  _M  ..21  --2! 
__  5  _.22  ..22. 
Total  gain  (+)  (  7)  4  (23)  70  (27)  (80)  (155) 
or  loss(·) 
*  derived  from  the difference  between  gross  margin1s  and  'fair' carriage charges 
**  assumes  a  5X  reduction  in  relevant  selling prices  to  retained  large  customers  of  transmission 
companies  •under  threat'  (current  gross  margin significantly above  'fair•  carriage charge) 
5.22  As  outlined earlier in this Section,  the  extent  to which  transmission 
companies  are  able  to absorb  any  adverse  financial  impact  of this kind 
would  depend partly on  their existing level  t::>f  profitability.  The 
financial  performance  of  the  major  gas utilities in the  seven Member  States 
examined is set out  in Table  5.6 below:-
Table  5.6:  Profitability of European Gas  Transmission Companies.  1987  *l 
% of  turnover  % of  ca~ital employed  *2 
British Gas  18.0 *3  19.4 *4 
Distrigaz  3.3  6.3 
Enagas  8.2  6.2 
Gasunie  1.6  6.7 
Gaz  de  France  10.4  11.5 
Ruhrgas  *5  10.4  18.2 
SNAM  12.7  32.8 
*1  based on  operating profit,  before  interest,  extraordinary  items  and 
tax 
*2  defined as  shareholders'  funds  plus net borrowing  (average  of opening 
and  closing balances  for  the  year) 
*3  historic cost accounts  for  1987/88,  gas  supply business  only 
*4  HCA  1987/88,  consolidated Group  results 
*5  consolidated accounts 5.23  This  table  shows  above-average  returns  on capital employed  for 
British Gas,  Ruhrgas  and  SNAM,  with an average  performpnce  by Gaz  de  France 
and significantly lower  returns  for  Distrigaz,  Enagas  and  Gasunie.  In  the 
latter case,  it should be  recalled that greater profits  a~e earned upstream 
by  NAM,  of which  a  significant proportion goes  in  taxation to  the  Dutch 
Government.  Enagas  appears  to have  had  good operating margins  in 1987 
(tables  5.3  and  5.4),  but  a  fairly  low  return on capital employed due  to 
low  grid utilisation.  In West  Germany  and  Italy,  it should be  noted that a 
substantial portion of total profit may  derive  from  transportation of gas 
for other utilities  (in the  case  of Ruhrgas)  and sales  to distributors  (in 
the  case of SNAM).  It should also be  noted that pure  transmission 
companies  (Distrigaz,  Gasunie,  Ruhrgas  etc)  generally need to  make  a 
relatively modest  margin  on  turnover  in order  to produce  a  satisfactory 
return on capital employed.  Vertically integrated companies  such as 
British Gas  and  Gaz  de  France have  a  much  larger capital base  in relation 
to  turnover  and need  to  earn a  higher margin  on  their sales. 
5.24  Although  1987  profits were  not  generally far out of line with 
previous  (1985  and  1986)  results,  significant differences  should be noted 
for particular utilities.  For  example,  the  exceptionally strong 
performance  of  SNAM  in 1987  represents  a  substantial  improvement  on 
previous years  and reflects  the buoyant profitability of the  whole  Italian 
gas  industry,  including distributors  such  as  Italgas as  well  as  the 
transmission company  SNAM.  In turn,  this reflects  the very high level of 
taxation on  domestic heating oil.  Distrigaz,  on  the  other hand,  performed 
significantly worse  in 1986  and  1987  than  in 1985,  partly as  a  result of 
very  low  duty-free oil prices  in Belgium. 
5.25  The  concept of  'normal'  profit depends  on  a  number  of factors, 
including  the cost of capital and  (in some  cases)  shareholders' 
expectations of a  return on  equity.  A number  of gas utilities are fairly 
highly geared and we  have  taken  the cost of borrowing  as  an  indicator of 
'normal'  profit in each Member  State.  We  have  assumed  that relatively low 
risk utility borrowers  would  generally be  able  to  obtain funds  at 1.5% 
above  the  1987  yield on  fixed  interest government  securities,  which 
represents  an  expected return on virtually riskless  lending.  A comparison of utility returns  on  capital  employed with  this  indication of  'normal' 
profit is set out  in  T~ble 5.7:-
Table  5.7  Utility Returns  and  'Normal'  Profits.  1987(%) 
Uti  lit~  19 8 7  Return'*:  'Normal'  1a:ofit** 
British Gas  19.4  11.0 
Distrigaz  6.3  9.3 
Enagas  6.2  14.3 
Gasunie  6.7  7.9 
Gaz  de  France  11.5  11.7 
Ruhrgas  18.2  7.3 
SNAM  32.8  12.3 
*  return on  capital  employed,  from  table  5.6 
**  yield on fixed-interest  government  securities,  plus  1.5% 
5.26  From  this it can be  seen that 1987  transmission company  returns 
were  considerably below  'normal'  in Belgium  and  (especially)  Spain, 
somewhat  below normal  in the  Netherlands,  broadly  in line with the cost of 
capital in France  and well  above  the cost of ,capital  in Italy,  West  Germany 
and  the  UK.  The  Gasunie  result is not representative of overall  gas 
industry profits  in the  Netherlands,  for  the  reasons  outlined above. 
5.27  The  analysis set out  in Table  5.5  suggested  that some  transmission 
companies  might suffer a  direct loss  in trading profit in the  event  of 
common  carriage  use  of their systems.  We  ass1~e that those whose 
profitability is currently below  a  'normal'  level would  pass  on the 
increased unit costs  to  smaller domestic  and  commercial  customers,  in order 
to protect an  already poor  financial  position.  A good  example  is the 
Distrigaz  take-or-pay cost referred to  above.  In view of the competition 
from  other  (oil)  fuels,  Distrigaz would find it difficult to  pass  the 
additional costs  on  to  its remaining  industrial customers.  It is therefore 
probable  that  the cost would ultimately be  passed  on via the distribution 
companies  to  domestic  and  commercial  consumers,  who  have  fewer  alternative 
fuel  options.  The  figure  of  ECU  23  million p.a.  is equivalent  to  an 3  average unit cost  increase of around  ECU  0.004/m  (2%)  on sales  to  smaller 
Belgian gas  customers  in  2000. 
5.28  To  the  extent  that common  carriage causes  transmission companies  to 
suffer a  loss of profit  (see Table  5.5),  we  would  expect  to  see:-
(a)  redistribution of  income  from  transmission companies  to industrial 
users  in Italy,  West  Germany  and  the  UK;  and 
(b)  redistribution from  small  consumers  to  larger users  in Belgium  and 
Spain. 
This  reflects  the pattern of profitability discussed above.  Our  best 
estimates of total redistribution effects  (on  the basis of 1987 
profitability)  are set out  in Table  5.8  below:-
Table  5.8:  Summary  of Redistribution Effects.  2000 
(ECU  million p.a.) 
Effect  ~  .E  l 
Benefit  to 
large users*  1  169  2  43  216  317 
Cost  to small 
users**  7  27 
Cost  to  23  80  155 
transmission 
companies*** 
*  sum  of direct  and  indirect effects  in  table  5.5 
**  total effect in relevant  countries  from  table  5.5,  assumed  to be  passed 
on  to  domestic  and  commercial  customers 
***  total effect in relevant countries  from  Table  5.5,  assumed  to be  absorbed 
as  lower profits 
5.29  To  put  these  figures  in context,  the  British Gas  current cost 
operating profit on  its gas  supply business  (for  example)  was  around  ECU 
1300  million in 1987/88.  We  are  therefore  suggesting  that competition or 
the  threat of competition via  common  carriage might  erode  about  12%  of 
current profits  in the  longer  term.  primarily  to  the benefit of large consumers.  In Italy,  SNAM  made  a  1987  pre-tax profit of almost  ECU  350 
million and,  in West  Germany,  Ruhrgas  alone  made  a  pre-tax profit on 
ordinary activities of some  ECU  430  million.  The  total increased costs 
projected to be  passed on  to  small  users  in Belgium are equivalent  to  a 
once-and-for-all  0.5%  increase  in tariffs;  the  corresponding figure  would 
be higher  in Spain,  at around  5%,  due  to  the  smaller size of the  domestic 
and  commercial  market,  and  the  greater  impact  of common  carriage on  the 
Spanish market. 
bO 
5.30  Our  assessment set out  above  only  looks:  at the  'first round'  effects 
of common  carriage on  the  distribution of  inc:ome  and welfare.  Especially 
if the  internal market  programme  is successful  in promoting  a  large, 
competitive market  for manufactured  goods,  a  substantial part of the 
benefit to  large  gas  consumers  may  be  passed  through  to  the ultimate buyers 
of their manufactured products.  Similarly,  benefits  to  power utility 
buyers  may  be substantially passed on to electricity consumers.  Reduced 
prices  for gas-intensive manufactured  goods  may  also bring macro-economic 
benefits  in terms  of  improved  Community  trade performance,  as  discussed in 
Section VI  below. VI  MACRO-ECONOMIC  BENEFITS 
Introduction 
6.1  In earlier Sections  of this  report,  we  considered  the possibility 
that  some  large  industrial or power  station users  might be  able  to secure  a 
lower delivered gas  cost to  their plant by:-
(a)  purchasing at a  lower border price  than  that achieved by  their 
existing supplier;  or 
(b)  undercutting the  gross  trading margin of their existing supplier,  via 
a  'fair'  carriage  charge. 
Moreover,  the  threat of direct purchase  arrangements  between large 
consumers  and  gas  producers  may  induce  existing suppliers  to offer rather 
more  favourable  prices  to  some  of their remaining  industrial and power 
station customers.  This  therefore creates  the possibility that  the  general 
level of industrial gas prices may  fall as  a  result of common  carriage. 
For simplicity in this discussion,  we  assume  that large user prices will be 
5%  lower across  the  Community  in the year  2000  than  they would  otherwise 
have  been,  as  a  result of introducing common  carriage.  This  represents  a 
combination of somewhat  lower border  gas  prices,  improved efficiency in 
transmission and distribution and  the  erosion of any monopoly profits 
currently earned by  some  transmission companies  on sales  to large 
customers. 
6.2  This  reduction in industrial  gas  prices  may  then lead to 
macro-economic benefits for  the  Community  as  a  whole,  as  a  result of 
bringing down  the  level of manufacturing costs  in gas-using  industrial 
sectors.  The  macro-economic  benefits  might  arise  from  a  number  of areas, 
including:-
(a)  improved export performance  of Community  manufacturers  in world 
markets; 
(b)  reduced penetration of Community  markets  by  manufactured goods 
imported  from  third countries;  and 
(c)  resource allocation benefits,  as  a  result of eroding  any  monopoly 
profit element  in industrial  gas  prices. 6.3  Effect  (c)  above  is  likely to be  of second-order quantitative 
importance;  on  an  approximate  basis,  we  estimate  the benefit for  the 
Community  as  a  whole  to  be  around  ECU  5 million p.a.1  We  therefore  focus 
principally on  (a)  and  (b)  above.  In order  to  indicate  the  likely level  of 
benefits,  we  have  reviewed  the  available evidence  on  the determinants  of 
Community  trade  performance  in general  terms,  in order  to  identify the 
impact of lower manufacturing costs  and prices.  We  have  also carried out  a 
brief case  study analysis  of  the  iron and steel sector,  as  agreed with  DG 
XVII. 
6.4  The  section is set out as  follows:-
(a)  Aggregated Evidence  - findings  from  the  literature regarding  the 
price elasticity of demand  for  Community  exports  and  imports, 
together with  an aggregate  assessment of potential macro-economic 
benefits;  and 
(b)  Iron and Steel  Industry  Case  Study  - to  obtain a  more  detailed 
picture of the  likely benefits  in an energy-intensive  industrial 
sector. 
A&gregated  Evidence 
6.5  We  have  reviewed  the  literature for  evidence  regarding  the price 
elasticity of demand  for  European manufactured exports  in world markets  and 
European manufactured  imports.  A number  of relevant studies have been 
carried out  in recent years  and we  highlight  the main  results  and 
conclusions  below. 
6.6  In 1984  revised price elasticity estimates  from  the  IMF's  World Trade 
Model  (WTM)  were  published2  Price elasticities for  the  volume  of 
1  In economic  terms,  this  is  the  "triangle"  of additional  consumer 
surplus  obtained when  demand  increases  as  a  result of eroding 
monopoly  profit.  Our  estimate  is based on  an  assumed  long-term price 
elasticity of  demand  for  gas  in the  industry/power  sector of 0.3. 
2  The  "World Trade  Hode 1:  Revised  Es tirna tes  '''  by  G. S.  Spencer  in the  IMF 
Staff Papers  September  1984. manufactured exports  and  imports,  in both  the  short-run  (one  year)  and 
long-run  (total response),  have  been calculated for  fourteen  industrial 
countries.  Table  6.1  below  summarises  the  major  results,  showing  export 
and  import  price elasticities for  the  European countries  covered.  The 
period covered is  1962  to  1979. 
Table  6.1  Relative  Price Elasticities  for  Trade  in Manufactures 
EC  Countries 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
West  Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
UK 
Imports 
Short-run  Long-Run 
Elasticity 
0.75 
0.52 
1.15 
1.02 
0.53 
0.56 
Elasticity 
1.15 
0.67 
0.52 
1.15 
1.02 
0.53 
0.56 
Source:  IMF  Staff Papers  September  1984 
Exports 
Short-Run  Long-Run 
Elasticity  Elasticity 
-0.59  -1.55 
-1.13  -1.13 
-0.48  -1.25 
-0.09  -1.41 
-0.51  -0.64 
-0.49  -0.89 
-0.31 
6.7  Of  the  seven  EC  countries,  four  - Belgium,  Denmark,  France  and West 
Germany  - have  long-run price elasticities for  exports  that are 
statistically significant at the  5%  level.  For all but  two  of the  export 
equations,  the  maximum  lag is less  than or equal  to  two  and  a  half years. 
Some  doubt  is expressed in the  article over  the plausibility of the  UK  lag 
structure,  where  the  lag stretches  to  five  years.  However  all seven 
countries'  export elasticities show  coefficients of  the  expected 
(negative)3  sign.  Overall,  we  can establish a  band of  -0.1  to  -1.1  for  the 
short-run and a  band of  -0.3  to  -1.6  for  the  long-run price elasticity of 
demand  for  the  major  European  economies'  exports.  All  the  EC  countries, 
except  for  Denmark,  have  statistically significant long-run price 
elasticities for  imports.  The  elasticities lie within  the  band of 0.52  to 
1.15,  giving an  average  of 0.8. 
3  An  increase  in own  export prices  relative  to  competitors'  prices  leads 
to  a  decline  in the  demand  for  own  exports 6.8  To  assess  the  macro-economic benefits associated with  a  decline  in 
gas  prices,  it is clearly desirable to  use,  the  long-run price elasticities 
to  ensure  the  total price effect is captur·ed,  By  using a  broad long· run 
price elasticity figure  of  -1.0  for  Community  exports  and  0.8  for  imports, 
we  can calculate  the potential change  in the  total Community  trade balance, 
following  a  reduction  in industrial gas  prices.  For  this purpose,  we  have 
assumed  that the  elasticities for  total  trade  by Member  States  (including 
intra-Conununity  trade)  are appropriate  to  the price responsiveness  of 
demand  for  trade with  third countries. 
6. 9  The  validity of the  lMF  WTM  est.imates  is supported by other recent 
empirical studies,  for  example  by Goldstein and Khan  (1984)4.  Comparing 
the  total price elasticity estimates  (ie the  sum  of export  and  import  pr:lce 
elasticities for  each country)  of the  WTM  with  those  summarised by 
Goldstein and  Khan,  we  find  that  the  former  estimates  lie within  the  ranges 
quoted by  the latter study for  almost  every  c.ountry. 
6.10  The  fact  that  the  average price elasticities from  the  IMF  model  arE~ 
not very high and  that for  three of the  seven.  countries  the  export price 
elasticity coefficients are not statistically significant is not 
unexpected.  A study by Lachler  (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 1985),  for 
example,  calculated the  price elasticity coefficients for  23  industrial 
sectors  in West  Germany  over  the  period 1960·1981.  While  the  results are 
not directly comparable  because  of his  use  of relative  demand  as  the 
dependent variable,  his findings  are  of interest.  Lachler  found  that  the 
highest price elasticities were  for  goods  in the  primary goods  sector, 
while  industries with  significant opportunities  for  product differentiation 
experienced,  in general,  lower  price elasticities of demand. 
6.11  Our  review of the  literature has  provided us  with estimates  of the 
price elasticity of demand  for  European manufactured exports  and  imports 
4  In  "Handbook  of International  Economics
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,  ed R W Jones  and  P  B Kenen 
(1984) which  we  use  below  in our  "broad brush"  quantitative assessment  of  the 
macro-economic benefits of  a  fall  in gas  prices.  However  it is clear that 
evidence  suggests  the  price of a  good  may  not  always  play the  role  assigned 
to it by  traditional  economic  theory.  We  will reconsider  this  issue  and 
the wider macro-economic  implications of a  fall  in gas  prices  once  the 
numerical exercise has  been set out. 
Oyerview of Benefits 
6.12  We  consider below  the benefits resulting from  a  fall  in the price of 
gas,  firstly by calculating the  possible  change  in the balance  of  trade  and 
secondly by  discussing the  main  linkages  involved. 
6.13  From  Table  6.2  below,  we  can calculate an average  gas  intensity of 
0.5%  for  the  EC  manufacturing  industry as  a  whole.  The  assumed fall in 
industrial gas  prices  is  5%,  as  outlined above.  The  total value  of EC 
imports  and exports  in trade with  third countries  for  1986  was  ECU  242.7bn 
and  ECU  310.9bn respectively. 
Table  6.2  Manufacturing Output  and  Gas  Intensity 
1986  ~  ,!..  IX  p  (Rk  ~  f  IRL  J 
Mm Oltp.Jt (EI1J l:n)  61.7  3.5  28.2  535.0  ...  136.6  339.5  16.9  214.1 
Ird  G3s c ('OX) 'IJ)  87.2  6;8  10.0  671.5  ...  65.6  385.1  11.7  389.0 
lrrl  G3s  C (mJ nn)  327.9  :0.3  37.9  3,216.5  ...  229.6 1,586.6  28.7  900.8 
**  Gas  intalsity (%)  0.5  0.9  0.1  0.6  ...  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.4 
*  Greek data t.rBVaii.Eble  fn:m El.n:nstat sa  .. n:res;  ro natural gps  U'3ed in fbrtJ.lgpl 
**  gj3S  mst:s as a prqx>1:tim of a..qut vah.e. 
NL  pk  U< 
78.9  20.5  323.3 
'E7.7  417.3 
913.9  - 1,:02.3 
1.2  0.5 6.14  From  this  information,  together with  the  average  price elasticities 
of demand  of  -1.0  and 0.8  fot  exports  and  imports  respectively,  we  can 
calculate  the  change  in the value  of the  EC  trade balance.  A  rough 
estimate of the  possible  imp~ct of a  fall  in gas  prices  on  the  EC  balancE~ 
of trade  is shown  in Table  6. 3.  This  table  draws  on  the  data presented ].n 
Table  6.2  and analysis carried out  above.  Table  6.3  shows  that the  direct 
impact  on  the  EC  trade balance  would  be  an  improvement  of around  ECU  127mn. 
Table  6.3  Impact  of Gas  Price  Falls  on  the  EC  Trade  Balance 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Assumed  fall  in industtial gas  prices 
Proportion of gas  in total manufacturing costs 
Price elasticity of dernand  for  EC  expor.ts 
Price elasticity of  de~and for  EC  imports 
Increase  in EC  manufactured exports  (ECU  p.a.) 
Reduction in EC  manufactured  imports  (ECU  p.a.) 
Change  (based  on  1986  data)  in the balance 
of Community  trade  (ECU) 
5% 
0.5% 
·1.0 
0.8 
78m 
49m 
6.15  The  analysis  above  provides  a  simplified picture of the potential 
effect on  the  trade balance.  Our  estimate may  over-state the  likely 
benefit,  because  of the  assumption made  regarding  the  pass-through of cost 
reductions,  in particular.  In practice,  a  fall  in the  price of gas  to 
industry is not likely to  be  fully passed  through  to  customers  and  some 
will be  retained by manufacturers  in the  form  of higher margins.  There  may 
still be  an  indirect effect on  trade  performance,  as  improved profits may 
induce  increased expenditure  on  improved customer  service or  increased 
advertising,  for  example,  which  in turn raises  market  share.  These 
indirect effects would  take  longer  to  work  through  and are not easily 
quantifiable.  Further second-order effects  m.ay  occur if increased  income 
in the  Community,  resulting from  reduced manufactured  goods  prices,  leads 
to  a  rise  in the  demand  for  imports. 
6.16  We  can summarise  this discussion by  saying that the  macro-economic 
benefits will primarily  depertd  on:-
(a)  the  gas  intensity of manufacturing production;  and .  -- ······-·------·--------·- ..••. --·- ~---
(b)  the  price elasticity of demand  for  EC  exports  to  third countries,  and 
for  imports  into  the  EC. 
At  the  aggregate  level,  the  low  gas  intensity of manufacturing production 
is such  that  the overall  impact  of common  carriage on  trade performance  is 
relatively limited.  However,  this aggregate  analysis  may  disguise  a 
si~nificant impact  on particular energy-intensive sectors,  particularly as 
price elasticities of demand  are likely to be higher  for  relatively 
undifferentiated energy-intensive manufactures.  We  have  therefore carried 
out  a  case  study of the  iron and steel sector,  the  results of which  are 
reported below. 
Case  study evidence 
6.17  This  section estimates  the  macroeconomic benefits that may  arise from 
a  fall  in gas  prices  to  the  iron and steel industry.  The  fall in gas 
prices  could potentially lead to macroeconomic benefits  from  two  sources: 
(a)  a  fall  in gas  prices may  lead to  a  fall  in the price of iron and 
steel products  relative to  those  of the major  competitors  of the  EC. 
In principle this would  cause  an  improvement  in the  terms  of trade, 
and as  a  result an  increase  in exports  (or a  decrease  in imports); 
and 
(b)  a  fall in the price of gas  may  have  an  impact  on  the allocation of 
resources both between and within Member  countries.  We  have  not 
considered this point any  further,  however,  as  the benefits are 
likely to  be  relatively small. 
6.18  The  size of the  fall in iron and steel production costs  and  the 
potential  for  increasing international competitiveness will depend  on  a 
number  of factors,  including: 
(a)  the  processes  in which  gas  is used  and  the  proportion of total costs 
that it accounts  for;  and -
-
-
--
(b)  the competitive position of the  EC  in world trade  for steel,  its 
derived products  and steel intensive manufactures. 
Each  of these factors  is discussed in turn in the  following paragraphs. 
Gas  use  in the  iron and  steel  industry 
6.19  The  iron and steel industry produces  a  range  of products  using a 
large number  of processes.  The  three  main activities are: 
(a)  iron production; 
(b)  steel making;  and 
(c)  finishing operations. 
68 
Of  these  three activities,  the  production iron of takes  place within an 
integrated plant which  would  include  a  steel making facility and possibly a 
finishing plant.  Each  of these activities,  and  the  type  and quantity of 
fuel  used,  is discussed below.  These  activities are also  shown 
schematically in Figure  6.1. 
6. 20  The  major  fuel  input  in iron production :is  coal.  Coal  is needed  to 
produce  coke  which  is an essential  input  into  the process.  The  coke  is 
produced by firing  the  coal  in coke  ovens.  A by-product of this process is 
coke  oven  gas,  which  can be  recycled and used in the coke  ovens  as  a  source 
of heat or later as  a  fuel  in steel making.  This  gas  tends  to be  fairly 
low  in calorific value  (around  19  MJ/m3)  and  can only be  used economically 
close  to  source,  since unit transport costs  are~ very high.  Coke  breeze is 
used to produce  sinter,  and  the  coke  and  the slnter are  then used in the 
blast furnace  to  form  iron.  Fuel oil or gas  can also be  added to  the blast 
furnace  to replace  up  to  20%  of  the  coke;  the use of fuel oil in this way 
is determined by  the  relative prices of fuel  oi.l  and coke.  In view of the 
surplus gas  produced  in these processes,  purchasing of fuel  to use  in this 
way  is not very common.  Blast  furnace  gases  are produced in the blast 
furnace  and are used later in the steel making process  or  recycled into  the 
blast furnace  itself.  They  are  generally of very  low calorific value, 
perhaps  only half that of coke  oven gas. (
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 6.21  There  are  three  common  types  of steel  making  plant: 
(a)  basic  oxygen steel making,  BOS; 
(b)  electric arc  furnace  steel making,  EAF;  and 
(c)  open hearth furnaces. 
ECSC  figures  show  that  in 1986  70%  of steel was  produced using  the  BOS 
furnace  and  30%  was  produced using  EAF. 
6.22  The  BOS  furnace  uses  molten  iron as  its input  and  therefore  tends  to 
be part of an integrated works.  Iron from  the blast furnace  is transferred 
to  the  BOS  furnace  where  oxygen is injected via a  lance.  No  additional 
fuels  are  required in this process  as  the  combination of the  oxygen with 
the hot metal  generates  the  required heat.  Scrap  iron can be  added  to  this 
process  to  the  limit of  the  reaction,  after which  additional fuel,  in the 
form  of oil or  gas,  is  required  to  produce  more  heat. 
6.23  Electric arc  furnaces  primarily use  scrap steel with  some  cold scrap 
iron.  The  primary  fuel  used  is electricity,  the majority of which  is used 
for  reheating of  the  iron and steel.  It is possible  to  reduce  the  amount 
of electricity used by  preheating  the  iron and steel using  LPG  or natural 
gas;  at fuel price relativities prior to  1986  this was  not considered 
economic.  Any  preheating of iron and  steel has  tended to use  by-product 
gases  as  the  major  fuel  input. 
6.24  Open  hearth  furnaces  used  to be  the  most  common  method used to 
produce  steel.  Approximately  equal  amounts  of scrap  steel and  iron are 
used.  The  iron and  steel  is heated in the  furnace,  which  is  fired by oil 
and natural  gas  or coke  oven  gas.  This  process  is  now  much  less  common. 
According  to  the  data  supplied by  the  UN  Commission  for  Europe,  no  EC 
country currently uses  open hearth furnaces.  However,  they  are still 
common  in Eastern Europe  and  developing countries,  where  the  proportion of 
gas  used  in steel manufacture  is  much  higher. 
6.25  Finishing operations  c~n be  further  divided  into: (a)  primary  finishing;  and 
(b)  secondary finishing. 
6.26  Primary finishing consists  of converting  the  crude  steel  to  slabs, 
blooms  or billets  - 'semi-finished'  steel.  There  are  two  alternative ways 
of converting  the  crude steel to semi-finished steel: 
(a)  ingot casting;  and 
(b)  continuous  casting. 
6.27  In an  ingot casting plant liquid steel  is poured  into moulds  to  form 
ingots,  which  are  then  reheated  and maintained at a  high  temperature 
(soaking)  for  4-12  hours.  After  soaking  the  ingots  are  further processed 
whilst  they cool  to  form  the  semi-finished products.  The  fuels  commonly 
used include oil or natural  gas,  which  are  used to provide heat  in the 
soaking process.  Enriched gas,  which  is a  combination of coke  oven  gas  or 
oxygen with blast furnace  gas,  is also  commonly  used  in this  soaking 
process. 
6.28  This  process  is relatively inefficient and  many  plants have  been 
converted to  continuous  casting plants.  Energy  is  saved  in this process  as 
the need for  soaking is  removed  as  the  liquid steel  is not  allowed  to  cool 
but is  instead drawn continuously  through rollers  and water sprays.  The 
energy  input  to  this process  is significantly lower.  The  steel waste  is 
also greatly reduced as  the  steel can be  tailored to  the correct size more 
efficiently.  A further significant advance  in fuel  use  has  been  the 
development of the  direct connection'  process,  whereby  instead of allowing 
the  slabs  to  cool  for  inspection,  the  slabs  are  inspected hot  and 
transferred direct to  the  rolling mill.  This  process  is already  in use  in 
Japanese  and  some  European plants  and would  tend  to  reduce  the  amount  of 
natural  gas  needed  for  reheating metals. 
6.29  In secondary finishing  the  semi-finished steel is converted  into 
final  products,  such  as wire,  plates etc.  In all cases  the  steel needs  to 
be  reheated and  rolled.  The  major  fuels  used  for  this  reheating are oil 
1i and  gas.  Examples  of  some  of  the  major  products  and their major  markets  are 
shown  in Table  6.4  and  ECSC  production by  product  is  shown  Table  6.5: 
Table  6.4 
Product 
Tinplate 
Strip mill products 
(eg.  rolled sheets) 
Welded  tubes 
Seamless  tubes 
Secondary  finishing  - products  and uses. 
Principal  end use 
Canning  industry 
Automotive  industry 
Construction industry 
Consumer  goods  (esp  consumer  durables) 
Construction,  water and general 
pipeage. 
Oil  and  gas  industry 
6.30  Table  6.6  shows  the  estimated fuel  use  for  the  UK  in each process, 
based on data available  in  1978:-
Table  6.6  :  Energy  used per  tonne  crude steel 
by  fuel  type  (est.  UK  1978) 
Fuel  type  (%) 
Process  Coal/  Natural  Other  Fuel  oil  Electricity  Other 
______________  c_o_k_e~-----~gas  ___  ~----------------------------------~<~i~n~c~·~h~e~a~t~.) 
Coke  ovens  89 
Blast  furnace  82 
Steel making  0 
Primary 
finishing  0 
Secondary 
finishing  0 
0  8 
0  12 
0  0 
80*  0 
89*  0 
note  * includes oil and  other  gases 
0  1  2 
6  0  0 
35  65  0 
0  20  0 
0  11  0 13 
Table  6.5  European  Production  in ESCS  Products  (1986) 
FRDOOCI'ICN  Crude  Contiru::lus  Hot  Heavy  Merchant  Wire  NarrCM  Plate  Cold 
(m.tonnes)  Steel  casting  Rolled Sections Bar &  Rod  Strip  Reduced 
Coil  llght  Sheet 
Sections 
Gennany  37.1  31.4  16.6  1.8  2.9  3.4  2.0  4.3  8.5 
Be1giun  9.7  7.0  7.0  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.1  1.2  3.3 
Frarx::e  17.9  16.1  9.6  0.9  1.9  2.1  0.3  1.1  5.9 
Italy  23.0  19.3  7.7  0.9  6.5  2.3  0.4  1.7  4.1 
l.l.Ixenboorg  3.7  1.3  1.3  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.3 
Nether  l.arYis  5.3  2.3  2.8  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  1.4 
United Ki.ngdan  14.8  8.9  5.3  1.6  2.0  1.6  0.3  1.0  3.3 
Dennark  0.6  0.6  0.2  0.4 
Irelarrl  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Greece  1.0  1.0  0.3  0.6  0.3  0.4 
Spain  11.9  7.3  2.5  1.3  3.7  1.2  0.3  0.5  2.2 
Portugal  0.7  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1 
EEC  12  125.9  95.7  51.8  u  19.4  12.3  !!J)  10.5  29.5 
Source:  ECSC;  excludes  forging,  steel  tubes,  wire  products  and 
ferro-alloys Table  6.6  demonstrates  that  the  use  of natural  gas  is concentrated in the 
finishing of steel products,  rather  than  in primary  iron and steel making, 
and  some  estimates  suggest  that blast furnaces  use  50%  of total energy  in 
the  iron and steel  industry.  Energy  use  in total for  each  EC  country is 
shown  in Table  6.7.  Natural  gas  accounts  for  14%  of total energy 
requirement  in the  iron and steel industry in the  EC  as  a  whole.  There  are 
wide variations between countries;  however,  the  major  exporting and 
producing countries all use  similar proportions  of natural gas  in iron and 
steel manufacture. 
6.31  Natural  gas  is  more  heavily used in the  processing of semi-finished 
steel than  in integrated iron and steel making.  However,  data  on  the  cost 
of inputs  to  the  UK  general  iron and steel making  industry and  the  steel 
finishing sector suggest that gas  costs  account  for  around  2-4%  of total 
costs  in each case.  Although  gas  accounts  for  a  larger proportion of  fuel 
costs  in the  finishing sector,  other non-fuel costs are also higher;  hence 
the proportion of gas  in total costs  remains  broadly  the  same.  For 
example,  natural  gas  accounts  for  11%  of total fuel costs  in the  UK  general 
iron and steel industry  (when  the  cost of coking coal  is  included),  and  35% 
of total fuel  costs  in the  steel tube  sector.  In France,  gas  accounts  for 
10%  of total fuel  costs  in the  iron and steel sector.  Table  6.8  shows  the 
estimated gas  cost intensity for  the  major  EC  iron and steel producing 
countries.  The  estimated  'gas intensities'  are  somewhat  lower  than  those 
suggested by  the  UK  and  French data,  probably reflecting the  use  of output 
value  rather  than production costs  as  the  denominator  in Table  6.8.  The 
overall gas  cost  as  a  percentage of output value  is generally in the  range 
1.0  - 2.5%.  In conclusion,  therefore,  gas  costs are  a  relatively small 
proportion of total costs  in the  iron and steel industry as  a  whole. 
Natural  gas  may  nevertheless  be  an  important  cost element  for specific 
products,  such  as  those  produced  in non-integrated  forging plants, 
especially as  a  proportion of value  added  (rather than total output value). 
EC  iron and  steel trade 
6.32  This  final  section considers  the  EC  position in world  trade,  and  the 
price  responsiveness  of exports  to  a  fall  in costs  of the  major  EC 
producers. Table  6.7  Energy  use  in the  Iron and Steel  industry  (%)  1986 
Country 
EC12 
Belgium 
France 
West  Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Luxembourg 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Netherlands 
Source:  OECD 
Coal 
(inc.  !Jrown, 
and  coke) 
46 
55 
so 
45 
37 
41 
60 
21 
45 
0 
54 
Oils 
6 
4 
4 
7 
8 
9 
5 
33 
0 
25 
1 
Fuel 
Natural  Other 
gas  gases 
14  20 
13  19 
10  20 
15  21 
19  17 
13  18 
8  20 
0  0 
9  18 
0  38 
16  21 
Electricity 
14 
9 
16 
11 
19 
10 
8 
100 
27 
36 
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6.33  The  EC  is  a  significant net exporter of  iron and  steel products.  In 
1987  they  accounted  for  18%  of production and  15%  of consumption  (see  Table 
6.8).  However,  EC  steel production has  fallen significantly over  the past 
15  years  (see  Table  6.9).  This  appears  to be  largely a  response  to  the 
fall  in both  economic  activity and steel intensity within  the  OECD.  In 
contrast,  world steel consumption  rose  by  9%  over  the  period 1973  to  1986. 
6.34  Through  this period of general  recession in the  iron and steel 
industry,  exports  as  a  percentage of total Community  production have  been 
rising.  Whilst  EC  consumption fell by  around  18%  from  1973  to  1986, 
production fell by just 12%;  correspondingly net exports  as  a  percentage of 
production have  risen  from  around  12%  in 1973  to  18%  in 1986. 
6.35  In 1987  the  total value  of iron and steel exports  to countries other 
than member  states was  13.7 billion ECU  (4%  of the value  of total  Community 
exports  to  third countries),  and  the  total value  of imports  6.1 billion ECU 
(2%  of total  imports),  with  a  net export value  of around  7.6 billion ECU. 
The  import/export balance of the  major  EC  iron and steel producing 
countries  is shown  in Table  6.10,  and  the  destinations of exports  in Table 
6.11;  the split of output by  product was  shown  above  in Table  6.5  above. 
6.36  The  major net exporting countries are  Belgium,  West  Germany,  and  to  a 
lesser extent  France,  Spain and  the  UK.  The  USA,  China,  N.Korea  and 
western developing countries  are  the  major net  importers of iron and steel 
J 
products;  most  of these countries  are  covered by  trade  restraint agreements 
with  the  EC. 
6.37  Over  the  past  five  years,  the  financial  performance  of  the  major 
European  iron and  steel producers has  been poor,  although  rigorous  cost 
cutting and restructuring exercises have helped  to  improve  the profit 
position of some  companies,  such  as  BSC.  In the  light of  the significant 
losses  that  some  European Steel makers  have  been  facing until very recently 
and  the  low proportion of total costs  that gas  accounts  for,  it is possible 
that manufacturers will not  reduce  prices as  a  result of a  fall  in costs 
and  instead seek  to  improve  profit margins. 
-.l! Table  6.9a:  World  Steel  Production by  Region 
EC  12 
USA 
Japan 
Other  OECD 
OECD  Total 
Western 
Developing * 
South Africa 
USSR  & E Europe 
China & N Korea 
Total 
Crude 
steel 
Tonnes(m) 
162 
137 
119 
39 
457 
28 
6 
178 
28 
Crude 
% of world  steel  % of world 
consumption Tonnes(m)  production 
23 
20 
17 
6 
66 
4 
1 
25 
4 
127 
81 
98 
46 
352 
85 
9 
224 
65 
17 
11 
13 
6 
47 
12 
1 
31 
9 
% change  in 
production 
1973-87 
-22 
-41 
-18 
+18 
-23 
+204 
+50 
+26 
+132 
Source:  1987  data:  IISI;  1973  data:  OECD 
Table  6.9b:  Consumption  of Crude  Steel by  Region 
EC  12 
USA 
Japan 
Other  OECD 
OECD  Total 
Western 
Developing * 
South Africa 
USSR  & E Europe 
China & N Korea 
Total 
Tonnes(m) 
143 
151 
92 
44 
430 
59 
6 
179 
34 
708 
% of world  % of world 
% change  in 
consumption 
consumption  Tonnes(m)  consumption  --~19~7~3~-~8~6~ 
.1986 
20 
22 
13 
6 
61 
8 
1 
25 
5 
100 
116 
104 
81 
46 
347 
107 
6 
226 
84 
770 
15 
13 
11 
6 
45 
14 
1 
29 
11 
100 
-18 
-31 
-12 
+  7 
-19 
+80 
+26 
+147 
+9 
* Latin America,  Africa,  Middle  East  and Far East,  excluding Japan,  China 
and North  Korea. Table  6.10  Exports  and  Imports  by  EEC  Country.  1987 
West  Germany 
Italy 
UK 
France 
Spain 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Others 
Total* 
Within  EEC 
Outside  EEC 
Exports 
(M  tonnes) 
21 
9 
7 
13 
6 
14 
6 
2 
42 
36 
*  includes  ECSC  and non-ECSC  products 
Imports 
(M  tonnes) 
14 
9 
5 
10 
3 
4 
5 
5 
43 
12 
Source:  Eurostat Iron and Steel Statistical Yearbook  1988 
Net  Export 
Balance 
(M  tonnes) 
7 
2 
3 
3 
10 
1 
(3) 
24 
Table  6.11  Origin and Destination of ECSC  Steel  Products.  1987 
% of  tonnage  traded 
Imports  Exports 
Europe  57  34 
Western  31  23 
Eastern  26  10 
Americas  *  33 
North  1  26 
of which  USA  1  21 
Asia  *  24 
Other  43  _9 
Total  100  100 
* split of imports  from  non-European  sources  not  available 
19 So 
6.38  As  a  reaction to  falling  iron and steel demand  in the  late 1970s,  the 
European Coal  and Steel Community  (ECSC)  negotiated a  series  agreements  and 
declared a  state of  'manifest crisis', which  led to  the  development  of 
capacity,  delivery quota  and  price controls.  The  main  impact of these 
measures  was  to  reduce  EC  iron and steel making  capacity significantly 
(capacity fell by  28%  from  1980  to  1987),  and  to restrict imports  into  the 
EC. 
6.39  The  EC  has  negotiated restraint agreements with most of the countries 
to which  the  EC  exports;  when  they were  first concluded,  these  accounted 
for  around  86%  of  EC  exports.  The  main  features  of such agreements  are 
that:-
(a)  third countries  agree  to restrict their quantities according  to  a 
'triple clause',  regarding non-concentration of arrivals by product, 
by Member  State or by  timing; 
(b)  agreements  are voluntary,  and  there  is no  sanction against breaches 
by exporting countries; 
(c)  third countries  are  exempted  from  anti-dumping actions;  and 
(d)  agreements  are  renegotiated annually. 
6.40  The  agreements  are  generally bilateral agreements  and obviously have 
a  significant impact  on  the  level  and value of trade.  The  actual 
restrictions placed on  trade  vary widely between countries;  while  those 
between  EFTA  and  EC  countries  are very liberal,  between  EC  and USA  the 
restrictions are  severe  and strictly enforced.  Some  commentators  believe 
that there will be  increasing pressure  to eliminate  these  agreements  as 
they are  against  the  spirit of  GATT  and may  be  counter  to  the spirit of the 
single internal market.  In  the  meantime,  price  responsiveness  in the 
current market  conditions  must  be  highly questionable. 6.41  A study of the elasticity of,substitution of domestic  for  imported 
goods  by  Lachler  (1985)  found  that the coefficient on  the relative prices 
of domestically and  imported  iron and steel products was  not significant. 
This  result is not surprising,  given the constraints on  the market  for  iron 
and steel goods  as  outlined above. 
Summary  and  conclusions 
6.42  The  main points which  can be  drawn  from  this analysis are:-
(a)  whilst gas  is a  fairly significant input to  some  sections of the  iron 
and steel industry,  it appears  that gas  accounts  for  a  relatively 
small percentage  of total costs overall; 
(b)  there  are  some  important  restrictions  on  international trade  in iron 
and steel,  especially with  the USA.  This  could suggest  that the 
price responsiveness  of exports will be  low  in some  markets,  although 
relaxation of  the  trade  agreements  may  increase price competition in 
the  future; 
(c)  the  financial  position of some  EC  iron and steel producers  may  mean 
that part of any  reduction in gas  costs  is retained as  improved 
margins,  rather than being passed through  to  selling prices;  and 
(d)  studies of the price elasticity of demand  for  the  iron and steel 
sector in particular suggest that the price responsiveness  is 
generally  low. 
On  the evidence  of the  above,  it is unlikely that in the short  term there 
will be  any significant macroeconomic benefits arising from  a  fall  in gas 
prices  to  the  iron and steel industry.  In the  longer  term,  however,  as 
VRAs  are withdrawn and iron and steel manufacturers  continue  to  improve 
their financial performance,  there may  be  some  benefits,  although  these are 
difficult to quantify at the  present  time. APPENDICES Appendix  A 
Detailed Netback Analysis 
Al.  Introduction 
A2.  · Belgium 
A3.  France 
A4.·  Italy 
AS.  Netherlands 
A6.  Spain 
A7.  West  Germany 
AS.  United Kingdom 
A9.  Industrial Selling Prices Introduction 
Al.l  As  outlined in the main  text  (Section II),  we  have  sought  to analyse 
the  cost and  revenue  structure of gas  supply  in each of seven Member  States 
in as  comprehensive  and consistent a  manner  as  the  available data will 
allow.  We  have  divided total gas  sales into two  broad market sectors  -
small domestic  and  commercial  users,  on  the one  hand,  and large industrial 
and power  station consumers,  on  the  other.  For  each sector,  we  then 
identified or estimated:- ·'~" 
(a)  average selling prices,  excluding tax; 
(b)  customer-specific costs  such as connection,  metering and billing; 
(c)  local distribution costs and,  where  relevant,  the average profit 
margin of the  local distributors; 
{d)  long distance  gas  transmission costs; 
{e)  the costs of seasonal  storage; 
(f)  the average cost of bulk gas  purchases;  and 
(g)  the  transmission companies'  average profit margins. 
Al.2  OUr  detailed analysis  is set out·on a  country-by-country basis in the 
following sections of this Appendix.  Figures are presented in local 
currencies and gas  units  (volume  or energy,  as  the  case may  be)  and are 
also converted into a  common  unit of ECU/m3.  The  choice of a  comaon  volume 
measure  (rather than an energy unit)  means  that prices are not strictly 
comparable  on  an energy content basis;  the  ra3  was  chosen becau.e it was 
considered that certain costs of key  fmportance  to this study 
{transmission,  storage,  etc.)  are more  likely to be related to vol.waes 
handled than to  the  energy content of the gas. 
Al.3  The  exchange  rates used to convert  from  local currencies are 1987 
averages,  as set out in Table Al  below.  In interpreting the results,· it 
should be  borne  in mind  that inter-country comparisons may  often be 
affected considerably by short  term fluctuations  in c:urrencyvalues.  To 
the extent that most  Member  States are party to  the European Monetary 
System.  however,  such  problem_~ may  be  less severe  than is  fr~quently the 
case. .. 
Belgium 
Table  Al:  1987  Exchange  Rates 
BF 
OM 
PTA 
FF 
LIT 
NFL 
£ 
Source: 
1  ECU  -
42.87 
2.06 
143.98 
6.88 
1462.93 
2.33 
0. 74 
Eurostat 
A2.1  The  problems  of data availability are  less marked  for  Belgium  than 
they are  for  many  Member  States,  since  the  gas  industry  is well  documented, 
both by its own  association Figaz  and  by  the  tripartite Supervisory 
Committee  (Comite  de  Controle)  for electricity and  gas.  Average  gas 
purchase  costs,  the  average  price at which  Distrigaz sells to  distributors 
and  the  average  selling price  for  each market  sector can all be  derived 
from  published sources. 
A2.2  Our  own  estimates  are  therefore  confined primarily to  the split of 
distributors'  non-gas  costs  into customer-related  ("connection")  and 
distribution elements  and  the  breakdown of Distrigaz  non-gas  costs  between 
transmission and  storage.  Here  we  have  relied on cost  levels which  are 
typical  in the  European  gas  business,  in the first case,  and  our 
understanding of the  Belgian  industry,  in the  second. 
A2.3  Our  analysis  of the  Belgian gas  industry is set out  in Table A.2 
below,  which  is accompanied  by brief explanatory notes,  and  illustrated in 
Figure  A2  overleaf.  It is perhaps worth  drawing attention to  the  zero cost 
shown  for  storage  in the  industry/power sector.  In 1987,  some  48%  of 
Distrigaz sales  to  industry and  the  power  sector were  interruptible. 
Interruption allowed  the  annual  load  factor of total direct sales  to be increased to  ar~und 65%,  broadly  in line with what  we  estimate  to be  the 
load factor  of  imported  gas  supplies. 
Table  A2:  Netback Analysis  for  Belgium.  1987 
ECU/m3<x100) 
DomLComm  IndLPower  DomLComm 
Average  Revenue  (1)  238.0  108.2  20.3 
Connection etc  (2)  15.0  1.3 
Distribution  (3)  45.0  3.8 
Distributors'  Profit  (4)  40.0  ~ 
Distrigaz/Distributor Price  (5)  138.0  11.7 
Transmission  (6)  11.8  5.7  1.0 
Storage  (7)  9.5  (5.21  ~ 
Netback  (8)  116.7  107.7  9.9 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  (9)  108.1  108.1  __L2. 
Distrigaz Operating Margin  (10)  8.6  ~  _QJ_ 
Average  Distrigaz Operating 
Margin  (11)  4.7 
3  *assuming an  average  calorific value  of 36.5 MJ/m 
Notes  on Table  A2 
(1)  Figaz  Statistical Yearbook,  1987. 
0.4 
(2)  Consultant's  estimate  based  on  typical  industry costs. 
(3)  As  per  (2)  above. 
IndLPower 
9.2 
0.5 
~ 
9.2 
~ 
(0.03} 
(4)  Estimate based  on  1986  figure  from  Comite.du Control Annual  Report. 
(5)  Figaz Statistical Yearbook,  1987. 
(6)  Consultant's  estimates.  Relatively  low  costs reflect the  small 
geographical  area of the  country. 
(7)  Calculated on  the basis  set out below:-r
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 Dom/Comm  Industry/Power 
Annual  Sales  (PJ)  192  147 
Load  Factor  0.3  0.65 
Peak Day  Sales  (TJ)  1749  620 
Peak Day  Supplies  (TJ)*  1144  876 
Peak Day  Storage Output  (TJ)  605  (256) 
Storage  Cost  (BF/GJ)**  9.5  (5.2) 
*  assumes  a  46%  average  load factor of supply,  based on the  mix  of 
Distrigaz  supplies  in 1987  and  individual  load factor  assumptions  for 
Dutch  exports  (30%)  and  for Algerian and Norwegian  gas  (90%  each). 
**  assumes  a  Belgian storage capacity cost of BF  3,000/GJ/day.  This  is 
above  the  capacity charge  in Dutch export contracts  (reportedly 
DM80jm3(hour,  equivalent to  BF  1,900/GJjday),  but well below  the  cost 
of expensive  offshore  storage  in the  UK,  for  example. 
(8)  Calculated by  difference;  weighted average  netback  is consistent with 
Distrigaz operating profit for  1987 
(9)  Distrigaz Annual  Report  for  1987 
(10)  Calculated by  difference;  weighted average  is equal  to  Distrigaz 
operating margin  for  1987 
(11)  Distrigaz Annual  Report  for  1987 
France 
A3.1  The  gas  industry  in  France  is not,  in fact,  vertically integrated 
in all respects.  Separate  local distribution companies  account  for  a  small 
proportion of final  sales  to  domestic  and  small  commercial  customers,  while 
CeFeM  and  SNGSO  are  responsible  for  transmission and direct sales  to  large .. 
users  in their own  supply areas  in central and south-west France 
respectively.  For  simplicity,  however,  we  have  reported revenues  and costs 
as  if the  industry were  completely  integrated,  which  we  consider  to  be  a 
sufficiently good  approximation for  the present purposes . 
A3.2  The  Gaz  de  France  Annual  Report  for  1987  contains  figures  for 
average  sales  revenue  (across all markets),  average  gas  purchase  costs  and 
average  non-gas  costs.  It also  shows  that GdF  made  very little overall 
operating profit in 1987.  We  have  supplemented this published  information 
with our  own  estimates of the  breakdown between different categories of 
cost in each market sector. 
A3.3  Our  results are set out  in Table  A3  below,  supplemented by 
explanatory notes  and  illustrated in Figure  A3  overleaf.  In respect of the 
large users•  market sector,  we  have  taken account of the  fact  that some 
consumers  are supplied from  the distribution network and others direct from 
the  transmission grid,  by  showing  low  average unit distribution costs  for 
that sector. 
Table  A3:  Netback Analysis  for  France,  1987 
FFLkWh  (xlOO)  3  ECULm  (xlOO} 
DomLComm  Industry  DomLComm  Industry 
Average  Revenue  ( 1)  13.8  6.5  22.1 
Connection etc  (2)  1.2  1.9 
Distribution  (3)  1.8  0.2  2.9 
Transmission  (4)  1.2  0.7  1.9 
Storage  (5)  0.5  0.1  ~ 
Netback  (6)  9.1  5.5  14.5 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  (7)  _9_.r.l  6.3  10.1 
GdF  Operating Margin  (8)  ~  .(Q.ll  _!t_2 
Average  GdF  Operating 
Margin  (9)  1.3 
3  * assurrtes  an  average calorific value  of 11  kWh/m 
10.4 
0.3 
1.1 
0.2 
8.8 
10.1 
iLll 
2.0 ,
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 Notes  on Table  A3 
(1)  Based  on data collected from  Member  States by  DG  XVII. 
(2)  Consultant's  estimate based on  typical  industry costs. 
(3)  Consultant's  estimates.  Low  distribution cost for  industrial users 
reflects  the  fact  that many  large consumers  are  served directly from 
the  transmission grid. 
(4)  Consultant's estimate. 
(5)  Consultant's estimates.  A very  large  amount  of storage  is required to 
handle high  load factor  supplies  and  is used  to  serve  industrial as 
well  as  domestic/commercial  markets.  Although  GdF  does  sell gas  on  an 
interruptible basis,  interruption is very rare in practice  and  a 
continuous  supply  is generally maintained by withdrawing  gas  from 
storage.  Storage  cost estimates are based on  the  following 
assumptions:-
Dom/Comm  Industry 
Annual  Sales  (bn  kWh)  174  130 
Annual  Load  Factor  0.4  0.7* 
Peak  Day  Sales  (bn  KWh)  1.19  0.51 
Peak  Day  Supplies"'''*  0.60  0.45 
Peak  Day  Storage  Output  0.59  0.06 
Storage  Cost  (c/kWh)***  0.5  0.1 
* on  the basis  that  interruption is  rare,  under  normal  circumstances 
**  assuming  an  average  supply  load factor of 0.8 
*** at an estimated cost of  FF  1.5/peak day  kWh 
(6)  Estimates  consistent with  GdF  Annual  Report  for  1987.18  c/kWh. 
(7)  GdF  Annual  Report  for  1987  (quotes  6.33  c/kWh). 
(S)  Calculated by  difference. (9)  GdF  Annual  Report,  1987.  Consistent with  (8)  above  when  individual 
market  netbacks  are  weighted by  total  French  consumption of 174 
billion kWh  (domestic/commercial)  and  130 billion kWh  (to industry). 
Reported GdF  sales  figures  also  take  account of 5.3 billion kWh  of gas 
exports,  sold at an average  price of 5.2  c/kWh. 
A4.1  Italy is rather different  from  Belgium and  France,  in the  sense  that 
direct sales by  SNAM  to  large  industrial  and  power  station consumers  are 
still significantly greater  than domestic  and  commercial  sales to  local 
distributors.  Large  user  gas  prices also  tend  to  be  below  those  in most 
Member  States,  while  prices  to  domestic/commercial  consumers  are  among  the 
highest  in the  Community. 
A4.2  We  estimate  (on  the basis of reported prices  for  imported and 
indigenous  sources)  that gas  purchase  costs  in Italy are  the  lowest of any 
Member  State examined,  which  in turn allows  large  consumers  to be  supplied 
at the  low prices  referred  to  above.  Unit storage costs  may  be  quite high; 
although relatively low  cost capacity is available  in partially depleted 
onshore  gas  fields,  a  considerable  amount  of storage capacity is required 
to handle  the high  load factor  of gas  purchased by  SNAM. 
A4.3  The  estimated pattern of revenues  and costs  for  Italian gas  sales  in 
1987  is  shown  in Table  A4  below,  which  is supplemented by  explanatory 
notes.  Figure  A4  illustrates  the  same  information in diagrammatic  form. 
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 Table  A4:  Netback  Analysis  for  Italy.  1987 
Dom/Comm 
387 
L/m3 
Ind/Power 
133 
ECU/m3Cxl00) 
Dom/Comm  Ind/Power 
Average  Revenue  (1) 
Connection etc  (2) 
Distribution  (3) 
Distributors'  Profit 
26.5.  9.1 
SNAM/Distributor  Price  (5) 
Transmission  (6) 
Storage  (7) 
Netback  (8) 
36 
110 
__1Q 
211 
56  28 
_11  2. 
142  103 
2.5 
7.5 
_2_.l 
14.4 
3.8 
_iL.2 
9.7 
1.9 
.Q..:.l 
7.0 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  (9)  100  100  ~  ~ 
SNAM  Operating Margin  (10) 
Average  SNAM  Operating 
Margin  (11) 
Notes  on  Table  A4 
20 
(1)  Based  on  data collected by  DG  XVII. 
_3_  ~  ~ 
1.4 
(2)  Consultant's estimate.  High  figure  reflects  low  average  consumption 
per customer  and  thus  high  fixed  costs per unit sold. 
(3)  As  per  (2)  above.  Also  reflects  small scale of many  local 
distribution companies. 
(4)  Consultant's estimate,  based  on  Italgas'  results  for  1987. 
(5)  Calculated by difference  using estimated  SNAM  average  revenue 
(L  167/m3),  the  estimated average  price  for direct industrial sales 
and  the  mix  of  SNAM  sales  in 1987  - 16.6  bern  for residential, 
commercial  and  automotive  use,  and  21.7  bern  for  industry  (including 
chemical  feedstocks)  and  power  stations. 
(6)  Consultant's  estimates. 
(7)  Consultant's estimates;  custs  are  based  on  the  following 
assumptions:-Dom/Comm  Ind/Power 
Annual  Sales  (bern)  16.6  21.7 
Annual  Load  Factor  0.40  0.75* 
Peak Day  Sales  (bern)  0.11  0.08 
Peak Day  Supplies**  0.05  0.07 
Peak Day  Storage Output  0.06  0.01 
Storage Cost  (L/m3)***  13  2 
*  on  the basis  that interruption is rare,  under  normal  circumstances. 
**  assuming  an average  load factor of 85%. 
*** at an assumed cost of 13,500/peak day  m3. 
(8)  Calculated by  difference. 
(9)  Estimate based on  the  assumption  that  60%  of  SNAM  supplies were 
imported at $2.30/mmBtu  (cif)t  together with  40%  from  indigenous 
sources at a  lower  average  price of $1.70/rnmBtu. 
(10)  Weighted  average  consistent with  SNAM  operating profit for  1987. 
{11)  Derived  from  SNAM  Annual  Report,  1987. 
Netherlands 
A5.1  The  Netherlands,  with a  mature  gas  market  and  a  relatively small 
geographical  area,  is characterised by  low  selling prices  and exceptionally 
low  non-gas  costs.  No  storage  costs are  incurred by  Gasunie,  since  the 
seasonal  flexibility of gas  supplies  is assured by  NAM  and reflected in the 
netback price which  Gasunie  pays  for  Groningen supplies.  It should perhaps 
be  emphasised  that  the  NAM-Gasunie  price is  a  transfer price,  designed  to 
produce  a  steady  {but  small)  annual  Gasunie profit of NFL  80  million,  after 
tax. 
A5.2  Average  selling prices  (from  Gasunie  to distribution companies  and 
from  gas utilities to  final  consumers)  can be  estimated fairly readily  from 
information published by  Gasunie  or by  VEGIN.  The  entire Gasunie  non-gas 
cost is  a  cost of  transmission.  We  have  used our  own  estimates  to split the  average  gross  distribution margin  into its various  cost  and profit 
elements. 
A5.3  Our  netback analysis  for  the  Netherlands  in 1987  is set out  in 
Table  AS  and  the  accompanying notes;  the  estimated position is  shown 
diagrammatically  in Figure  AS. 
Table  AS:  Netback Analysis  for  the  Netherlands.  1987 
Average  Revenue  (1) 
Connection etc  (2) 
Distribution  (3) 
Distributors'  Profit  (4) 
Gasunie/Distributor Price  (5) 
Transmission  (6) 
Storage  (7) 
Netback  (8) 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  (9) 
Gasunie  Operating Margin  (10) 
Average  Gasunie  Operating 
Margin  (11) 
Notes  on  Table  AS 
DomLComm  IndLPower 
35.8  20.0 
2.5 
4.9 
_.L.Q 
26.4 
1.1  0.7 
- - -- --
25.3  19.3 
19.2  19.2 
_u  ~ 
0.1 
3  ECU/m  xlOO 
DomLComm  IndLPower 
15.4  8.58 
1.1 
2.1 
~ 
11.3 
0.5  0.30 
- - -- --
10.9  8.28 
~  8.24 
...L..Q  0.04 
0.04 
(1)  Based  on  data gathered by  DG  XVII,  Gasunie  Annual  Report  for  1987  and 
information published by  VEGIN. 
(2)  Consultant's  estimate.  Low  cost reflects high  average  consumption 
per customer  and  mature  domestic  market. 
(3)  Consultant's estimate.  Low  cost reflects  small  geographical  area and 
density of gas  consumers  on  the  distribution grid. 
(4)  Consultants'  estimate,  calculated by difference  from  lines  (1)  to 
(3). F
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 (5)  Derived  from  Gasunie  Annual  Report~  1987. 
(6)  Consultant's estimates  based  on  Gasunie's  total costs  from  1987 
Annual  Report. 
(7)  No  storage cost,  due  to  the  flexibility of Groningen supplies. 
Effectively,  the  cost of providing  low  load factor  supplies  is 
incorporated  in  the  purchase  price paid by  Gasunie  to  NAM. 
(8)  Calculated by  difference  and consistent with average  Gasunie  netback 
for  1987,  as  follows:-
Market 
To  Distributors 
Direct Sales 
Exports 
Total 
Sales  (bern) 
23.1 
21.0 
30.7 
74.8 
* not  shown  in table  AS 
(9)  Gasunie  Annual  Report,  1987. 
Est.  Netback 
25.3 
19.3 
14.9* 
19.3 
(10)  Calculated by  difference  to  be  consistent with Gasunie  pre-tax profit 
for  1987. 
(11)  Based  on  Gasunie  Annual  Report,  1987  (pre-tax profit). 
A6.1  The  Spanish  gas  market  is unusual  in that only  20%  of gas  sales is 
currently accounted for by  domestic  and  commercial  customers.  Industrial 
and power  sector  consumption  makes  up  the  remainder,  of which  some  55%  is 
supplied direct by  ENAGAS  and  the  rest by  regional  suppliers  (Catalana de 
Gas  and  Gas  de  Euskadi)  who  also  supply  domestic  and  commercial users. 
A6.2  This  pattern of gas  consumption has  two  main  implications  for  non-gas 
costs  - storage  requirements  are  relatively low  (and Spain has  no 
underground storage at present)  because  the  load factor of sales  is high, 
while distribution costs  are  relatively high,  reflecting the  early stage  of 
natural  gas  industry development  at  the  distribution level. A6.3  Our  netback assessment  for  Spain  is set out  in Table  A6  and 
illustrated in Figure  A6  below. 
Table  A6:  Netback Analysis  for  Spain.  1987* 
~/thennie 
3 
ECU/m  (xlOO)** 
Im/Ccrrm  lnd(R)  Ird/Power(E)  IXm/Coom  Ird(R)  Ind/Power(E) 
Average  RevenJe  (1)  6.2  2.5  1.6  41.1  16.6  10.6 
C'.orlrection etc (2)  1.0  6.6 
Distri.h.ttion (3)  2.6  0.5  17.2  3.3 
Dist:rib.ttors'  Profit (  4)  0 .  7  0.1  4.6  .JLl. 
ENAGAS;Dist:rib.ttor 
Price  (5)  1.9  1.9  12.6  12.6 
Transmission  (  6)  0.9  0.5  0.3  6.0  3.3  2.0 
Storage  (7)  _QJ  0.1  2.0  .illJl 
ENAGAS  Netback  (  8)  0.7  1.4  1.4  4.6  9.3  9.3 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  (9)  _u  _lJ,  .u  _u_  u  u 
ENAGAS  Operating 
Margin (10)  iQJU  _QJ  0.3  1lJ2  2.0  2.0 
Average  ENAG\S 
Margin (11)  0.16  1.1 
* (R)  denotes  regional suppliers  (  Catalana de  Gas  and Gas  de Euskadi) ; 
(E)  denotes  EN\CAS) 
**a.ssuning 9. 55  thermies/m 
3 
( 1  thennie - lCXX)  kcal) 
Notes  on  Table  A6 
(1)  Estimates based  on  data  gathered  from  Member  States by  DG  XVII, 
together with Annual  Reports  for  ENAGAS  and  Catalana  de  Gas. 
broad categories  of gas  sales are  considered,  as  follows:-
Three 
Distributors'  sales  to  domestic/commercial  users  5.5  bn  thermies 
Regional  suppliers'  sales  to  large  users  10.3 bn  thermies 
ENAGAS  direct sales  to  large  users 
Total 
12.8 bn  thermies 
28.6 bn  thermies 
(2)  & (3)  Consultant's  estimates.  High  connection  and distribution 
costs reflect  low  average  consumption  and  density of connections. "
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 (4)  Estimates  based  on  Catalana  de  Gas  results  for  1986. 
(5)  Calculated  from  estimated average  revenue  from  ENAGAS  industrial 
sales,  overall  average  revenue  of Pta 1.77/thermie  (derived  from 
ENAGAS  Annual  Report,  1987)  and  following breakdown of  ENAGAS  natural 
gas  sales  in 1987: 
To  distribution companies 
Direct to  large users 
15.8 bn  thermies 
12.8  bn  thermies 
(6)  Consultant's  estimates,  reflecting load factor by market. 
(7)  Spain has  limited LNG  storage  and  no  underground  storage at present. 
Cost estimates  are based on  the  following  assumptions:-
Dom/Comm  IndCR)  Ind/Power(E) 
Annual  Sales  (bn  thermies)  5.5  10.3  12.8 
Load  Factor  0.40  0.70*  1.00* 
Peak Day  Sales  (m  thermies)  38  40  35 
Peak  Day  Supplies**  20  38  48 
Peak  Day  Storage Output  18  2  (13) 
Storage  Cost  (Pta/therrnie)***  0.3  (0.1) 
*  after allowing  for  interruption of interruptible sales 
**  at an annual  average  load  factor  of  75% 
***  at a  rate of Pta  SO/peak  day  therrnie,  reflecting the  high cost of LNG 
storage 
(8)  Estimates,  consistent with  ENAGAS  average  netback  for  1987  of Pta 
1.27/thermie. 
(9)  Derived  from  ENAGAS  Annual  Report,  1987. 
(10)  Estimates,  consistent with  average  ENAGAS  operating margin  for  1987. 
(11)  ENAGAS  Annual  Report,  1987. West  Germany 
A7.1  The  structure of  the  West  German  gas  industry  is highly  complex,  with 
thrBe  levels of gas utilities  involved;-
(a)  producing or  importing  gas  utilities such  as  Ruhrgas,  BEB  and 
Thyssengas,  who  also  act  as  regional  suppliers  in part of  the 
country; 
(b)  regional  transmission companies  such as  Bayerngas  and  GVS;  and 
(c)  local distribution companies,  for  the most part wholly or partly in 
municipal  ownership. 
A7.2  This  rather  complex structure gives  rise  to  a  number  of ways  in which 
gas  can be  traded and  sold,  as  follows:-
(i)  direct  from  importing utilities  to  large  consumers; 
(ii)  from  importing utilities to regional  transmission companies  and 
thence  to  large  consumers; 
(iii)  from  importing utilities to  local distributors  in their own  regional 
supply areas  and  thence  to  consumers,  both domestic/commercial  and 
larger users;  or 
(iv)  from  importing utilities via  regional  transmission companies  to  local 
distributors  and  thence  to  consumers. 
A7.3  For  the  purposes  of analysis,  we  have  simplified this  complex 
position and classified the  industry  into  transmission  companies  (whether 
importers  or  regional  suppliers)  and  local distributors.  In  terms  of the 
sales categories  above,  (i)  and  (ii)  are  consolidated into  transmission 
company  sales,  while  (iii)  and  (iv)  are  shown  as  sales  from  the 
transmission level  to  distributors  and  then  to  final  consumers. 
Distributors'  sales  are  divided  in turn between  the  domesticjcomrnercial 
market  and  industrial/power sector consumers.  Precise  information on  the 
split of industrial  consumption  between  transmission  company  and 
distributor sales  is  not  available,  but it is understood  that each  accounts 
for  about half the  total.  In  general,  transmission companies  tend  to sell 
direct to  the very  large  users  with  lower  gas  prices  and  this  is reflected 
in our estimates  of average  s~.,lling prices. A7.4  The  complex  and  fragmented  structure of  the  industry also  makes  it 
more  difficult to estimate  the  typical or average  level  and structure of 
non-gas  costs.  For  example,  total Ruhrgas'  average  non-gas  costs  in 1987 
were  around  Pf 0.3/kWh,  but  this  is only part of total transmission level 
non-gas  costs  because  a  considerable proportion of all gas  sold also passes 
through  the  hand of a  regional  transmission  company.  A similar point 
relates  to  the  average  price at which  gas  is sold from  transmission 
companies  to distributors.  Average  Ruhrgas'  sales  revenue  of  some  Pf 
1.9/kWh mainly  reflects sales  to  other pipeline  companies  and  the  price for 
sales  to distributors  is likely to  be  somewhat  above  this  level.  We  have 
therefore  reflected this  in our estimates,  based on our  understanding that 
the  average  gross  distribution margin  in West  Germany  may  be  somewhat  less 
than Pf  1.5/kWh.  As  transmission company  sales  to distributors  include  a 
capacity charge  as  well  as  a  commodity  charge,  we  have  also  indicated a 
(notionally)  higher average  sales price for  low  load factor  supplies  to 
domestic/commercial  users  than  for  higher  load factor sales  to  larger 
users. 
A7.5  The  breakdown  of gross  trading  (distribution or  transmission)  margins 
into their constituent cost  and profit elements  is not  readily available 
from published sources.  We  have  therefore  used  our  own  estimates,  based  on 
what  is known  about  the  West  German  gas  industry  (load factor of bulk gas 
supplies,  type  of storage facilities,  etc.)  and  typical cost levels  in the 
European  gas  sector more  generally.  The  transmission company  profit margin 
of Pf 0.2/kWh is based on  Ruhrgas'  results  for  1987. 
A7.6  Our  analysis  of costs  and  netbacks  in West  Germany  is presented in 
Table  A7  and  Figure  A7  below. ,
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 Table  A7:  Netback  Analysis  for  West  Germany.  1987* 
Pf/1~111  3 
EaJLm  (x1002-kk 
ran;  Irrl/  Irrl/  IXxn/  In:l/  Irrl/ 
Comn  Power(D2  Power(T2  Coom  P<::Mer(D2  Power(.T2 
Average  Selling Price  (1)  4.1  2.8  1.9  20.9  14.3  9.7 
Conrvaction etc (2)  0.3  1.5 
Dist::ri.bution  (3)  0.8  0.5  4.1  2.5 
Distributors'  Profit (4)  0.5  ~  ~  .L.Q 
Transmission;Distrib' n price  (  5)  2.5  2.1  12.7  10.7 
Transmission  (6)  0.8  0.5  0.4  4.1  2.5  2.0 
Storage  (7)  QJ  - iQJl  Q:2  - .aL22  - -
Transmission Co.  Netback  (8)  1.6  1.6  1.6  8.2  8.2  8.2 
Gas  Purchpse Costs  (  9)  ~  1.4  .u  .Ll  .Ll  .Ll 
Transmission Co.  Margin (10)  0.2  0.2  0.2  .LQ  .LQ  .LQ 
Average  Transmission Co.  Margin( 11)  0.2  1.0 
*  (D)  den:>tes  distributors'  sales;  (T)  denotes direct sales fran transmission ~es  to 
large  const.~Iers 
** assuning 10. 5  ld-1h/m 
3 
Notes  on Table  A7 
(1)  Prices based on data collected by  DG  XVII.  Sales  for  1987  estimated 
to be  as  follows: 
Domestic/Commercial  (distributors'  sales) 
Industry/Power  (distributors'  sales) 
Industry/Power  (transmission co.  sales) 
270  bn  kwn 
146  bn  kWh 
147  bn  kWh 
(2)  & (3)  Consultant's  estimates based on  typical cost  levels  in the 
industry. 
(4)  Consultant's estimate. 
(5)  Based  on  estimated average  gross  distribution margin  of Pf  1.4/kWh; 
different prices  to different  markets  reflect capacity charge  element  in 
the  price. 
A05 (6)  & (7)  Consultant's  estimates,  informed  by  Ruhrgas'  non-gas  costs  for 
1987  (around  Pf  0.3/kWh)  and  average  revenue  (from sales  to other 
pipelines,  distributors  and  large  industrial users)  of around  Pf  1.9/kWh. 
Storage cost estimates  are based  on  the  following  assumptions:-
Dom/Comrn  Ind/Power(D) 
Annual  sales  (bn kWh)  270  146 
Assumed  Load  Factor  0.40  0.65* 
Peak  Day  Sales  (bn  kWh)  1.85  0.62 
Peak  Day  Supplies**  1.23  0.67 
Peak  Day  Storage  Output  0.62  (0.05) 
Storage cost  (Pf/kWh)***  0.1 
*  after allowing  for  interruption,  where  applicable 
**  assumes  an  average  supply  load  factor of  60% 
***  at an  assumed  cost of  DM  0.5/peak day  kWh 
(8)  Calculated by difference. 
Ind/Power(T) 
147 
0.85* 
0.47 
0.67 
(0.20) 
(0.1) 
(9)  Assumed  $2.40/mrnBtu  and  cross-checked against Ruhrgas  Annual  Report 
for  1987. 
(10)  Consultant's estimates.  Average  margin  is  consistent with Ruhrgas 
results  for  1987. 
(11)  Based  on  Ruhrgas'  pre-tax operating profit for  1987. 
United Kingdom 
A8.1  Average  revenue  by  market  in Great Britain is published by  British 
Gas  in its Annual  Report.  Some  information on  the  breakdown  of non-gas 
costs by market  is available  from  the  recent Monopolies  and Mergers 
Commission  (MMC)  report  on  British Gas'  industrial supplies.  We  have,  in 
some  cases,  adapted cost figures  published in  the  ~me report  to  the  format 
required  for  our analysis. A8.2  The  negative  storage cost  for  industrial sales may  require  some 
further  comment.  This  reflects  the  use  of interruptible contacts  in severe 
weather,  releaving beach supplies  and  system capacity  to  meet  peak  time  gas 
demand.  Effectively,  the  industrial market  as  a  whole  allows  BG  to  save  on 
storage capacity costs,  since  the  local  factor of consumption  (after 
interruption)  is higher  than  the  average  load factor  of beach  supplies. 
Table  A8:  Netback Analysis  for  the  UK.  1987/88 
Pence/Therm  ECU/m3(x100)* 
Dom/Comm  Ind  Dom/Comrn  Ind 
Average  Revenue  (1)  40.3  23.5  19.6  11.4 
Connection etc  (2)  1.9  0.9 
Distribution  (3)  7.5  1.6  3.6  0.8 
Transmission  (4)  3.6  1.8  1.7  0.9 
Storage  (5)  L.1.  .&.2.1  -L.J  ~ 
Netback  (6)  24.6  21.0  12.0  10.2 
Gas  Purchase  Costs  (7)  17.0  17.0  ~  ~ 
Operating Margin  (8)  ..L.2  ..JL.Q  _]_J_  1.9 
Average  Operating Margin  (9)  6.5  3.2 
*assuming 1  therm- 2.78  rn3 
Notes  on  Table  A8 
(1)  British Gas  Annual  Report  for  1987/88.  In 1987/88, 
domestic/commercial  sales were  12,896  million  therms  (35.9 billion 
cubic metres)  and  industrial sales  5,810  m.therms  (16.2  bern),  making 
a  total of  18,706  m.therms  in total.  There  are  currently no  BG  sales 
into power  stations. 
(2)  Consultant's  estimate  based  on  MMC  Report  of  1988  and  BG  quarterly 
standing charges. 
(3)  Quoted  in MMC  Report  is a  likely average  charge  for  common  carriage 
through  the  BG  distribution system. ,
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 (4)  Based  on  MMC  Report  and  BG's  quoted charges  for  third party gas 
transmission. 
(5)  Storage  costs  (which  in this  case  include  the  cost of seasonally 
producing  gas  fields)  were  estimated as  follows:-
Dom/Comm  Industrial 
Annual  Sales  (m.therms)  12,896  5,810 
Load  Factor  0.40  0.85* 
Peak Day  Sales  (m.therms)  88  19 
Peak  Day  Beach  Supply**  53  24 
Peak  Day  Storage Output  35  (5) 
Storage  Cost  (p/therm)***  2.7  (0.9) 
*  assumes  a  60%  load factor  for  firm  sales  and allows  for 
interruption of half the  contract  load,  under  interruptible sales 
contracts 
**  assumes  a  0.67  load  factor  of  BG  beach supplies,  excluding 
seasonal  fields  (Sean,  Morecambe)  and offshore  storage  (the  Rough 
field) 
***  derived  from  an  estimated storage cost of  £10/peak  day  therm of 
storage  requirement 
(6)  Derived  from  BG  Annual  Report. 
(7)  Includes  gas  levy;  derived  from  BG  Annual  Report. 
(8)  BG  Annual  Report. 
(9)  Weighted  average  across both market  sectors. 
Industrial Selling Prices 
A9.1  For  the analysis  (in Section V)  of utilities'  gross  trading margins 
on  firm  and  interruptible sales  to  large  industrial  and  power  station 
consumers,  we  have  estimated  the  following  average  selling prices  for 
1987:-AAO 
Table  A9:  IndustrialLPower  Sector Selling Prices.  1987 
(estimated,  ECU/m3  x  100) 
Firm  Interru:Qtible  Average 
B  10.1  8.2  9.2 
F  11.3  9.1  10.4  , 
I  10.0  8.2  9.1 
NL  8.9  8.2*  8.6 
SP  16.6  10.5  13.3 
FRG  13.5  8.2  12.0 
UK  15.3  8.2  11.4 
*  power  stations only APPENDIX  B 
Extent  of  Common  Carriage Extent  of Common  Carriage 
Bl.  Quantitative  assessment  of  the  direct effects of common  carriage 
(which  may  be  much  less  important  than its indirect effects on  the  gas 
market  in general)  requires  a  view of the  likely use  of common  carriage 
rights,  which  we  set out  in this Appendix.  Our  view  is that the very 
extensive  use  of third party transportation in the United States  in recent 
years  reflects  the particular gas  industry structure  and market pressures 
prevailing in that country.  It cannot be  taken as  indicative of what  would 
be  likely to  happen  in the  Community,  where  pricing is more  market-oriented 
and  the nature of competition between major  gas  producers/suppliers  is very 
different.  In the  UK,  for  example,  a  legal right of common  carriage has 
existed since  1982  and  there  is,  as yet,  no  third party use  of the  BG 
system,  although  this will  probably begin  to  emerge  over  the  next year or 
two.  Even  if a  common  carriage  system were  introduced at the  Community 
level by  1992,  we  would  not  expect it to  be  widely used by  the  mid  1990s. 
We  therefore  consider  in this  Section  the  likely situation as it may 
develop  by around  the  turn of  the  century. 
Assessment 
B2.  Before  considering  individually the  seven Member  States  covered  in 
detail by this report,  it may  perhaps  be helpful  to make  some  introductory 
remarks  regarding the  prospects  for use  of common  carriage  in general:-
(a)  local distribution companies,  with  low  load factors,  little storage 
of their own  and often with particular gas  quality requirements, 
would generally find it difficult to  conclude direct gas  purchase 
agreements  with  gas  producers.  They  might  pool  their purchasing 
power  to  overcome  the  problems  of size,  but would still be  faced with 
a  complex  'package'  of transportation,  storage  and  (possibly)  gas 
mixing  agreements  to  conclude with  their erstwhile  transmission 
company  suppliers; 
(b)  those  large  industrial or power  station consumers  who  take 
substantial volumes  on higher  load factors  at a  single  transmission 
grid location would  generally be  much  better placed to  secure  a 
direct supply; ... 
• 
(c)  interest in direct supply will  tend  to  be  greatest where  current 
transmission company  margins  appear  to be  high  (see  section V above); 
and 
(d)  in some  cases,  common  ownership  between distribution and  transmission 
companies  is likely to militate against  "by-passing  ..  of  the  latter by 
the  former. 
B3.  The  actual extent of common  carriage will depend  on  the  attitude of 
producers  as well  as  consumers.  In the U.S.,  for  example,  the 
determination of small,  independent producers  to market  shut-in gas  was  a 
major  factor  in the  emergence  of widespread third party gas  transportation. 
No  U.S.  producer  is very large  in relation to  the  total market  and  the 
impact of  individual marketing efforts on  the  general  level of prices was  a 
second-order consideration,  compared with  the need  to  find  a  sales outlet 
at all.  In the  European  Community,  the picture is very different.  Leaving 
aside  the  UK,  which will supply  the vast bulk of its own  requirements  at 
the  end of the  century,  four  producing countries  (Algeria,  the  Netherlands, 
Norway  and  the  USSR)  are  likely to  account  for  over  70%  of gas  supplies  to 
the  rest of the  Community  in  2000.  Of  these,  the  three  non-Member  States 
will provide over  40%  between  them.  For  this reason,  each producer will 
consider most  carefully the  likely impact  on  general market  realisations of 
any attempt  to  gain market  share  or to  expand  the  market via common 
carriage.  In particular: 
(a)  the  Netherlands  is able  to  export all the  gas  it wishes  to  under 
existing arrangements  and  may  therefore be  considered unlikely to 
pursue  the  direct sales  option; 
(b)  Norway  is generally a  high cost producer  and would have  little to 
gain  from  an aggressive  'price war'  with other producing countries; 
(c)  Algeria has  traditionally followed  a  high-price strategy,  although 
some  recent deals  (with British Gas,  for  example)  have  shown  greater 
flexibility and  there are  economic  pressures  to make  use  of- excess 
deliverability to boost  export  earnings;  and 
(d)  the  USSR  might  see  common  carriage  as  a  way  round  any political 
'ceiling•  on its market  share  in some  importing countries,  but again 
would  not wish  to  see  a  round  of competitive price cuts bringing down 
the  general  level of prices. Producers  also have  existing relationships with  gas  transmission companies 
which  they will not  wish  to  impair,  since  these  companies  will continue  to 
account  for  the vast majority of gas  imports.  This  sort of caution has 
been  shown  in the  UK  gas  market  since  1982  and we  would  expect it to 
characterise  the wider  Community  market  in the  1990s,  even if a  common 
carriage  system is  introduced.  Likely producer attitudes reinforce  our 
view  that  the  level of common  carriage use  in 2000  will be  modest. 
B4.  In Belgium,  the  degree  of common  ownership  between Distrigaz  and  a 
number  of joint venture  local distribution companies  ('intercommunales 
mixtes')  through  the  Intercom/Tractebel  group  is  a  specific factor which 
makes  direct buying by  distributors  less  likely.  Intercom/Tractebel hold 
some  33%  of Distrigaz  and  Intercom is  involved  in around  40%  of all gas 
distribution at a  local  level.  Moreover,  the distributors  located on  the 
'L gas'  (Groningen quality)  grid in northern and central Belgium would 
require  gas  mixing  facilities  in order  to purchase  gas  from  other  'H'  gas 
sources. 
BS.  In 1987,  power utilities accounted for  some  19  TJ  of gas  sales, 
around  6%  of the  total Belgian market.  These  utilities might,  in 
principle,  seek  to  buy  direct,  but  Intercom is also heavily involved in 
power  generation  (accounting for  38%  of total production in 1987)  and is 
perhaps unlikely  to  seek  a  supplier other  than Distrigaz  for  its gas 
requirements.  The  other private  generating utilities,  Ebes  and Unerg,  are 
also  important  gas  distributors  and  they  too  have  established relationships 
with Distrigaz which  they  might  not  wish  to  impair.  In Belgium, 
electricity generation planning is carried out cooperatively by  the 
utilities,  with considerable  Government  supervision  through  the  Comite  de 
Controle.  The  Government  favours  a  new  gas-fired plant to be  commissioned 
in the  mid  1990s  and  envisages  that  around  1  bern/a  would  be  supplied by 
Distrigaz  to help utilise a  contracted surplus  of  LNG  from Algeria.  For 
these  reasons,  we  consider direct supplies  to  the  power  sector via common 
carriage  to be  unlikely,  at least before  the  turn of  the  century. 
B6.  This  leaves  the  possibility of direct sales  to  large  industrial 
consumers,  especially  the  chemical  industry and  the steel sector.  In 1987, 
these  two  sectors  accounted  for  16%  and  7%  respectively of total natural gas  consumed  in Belgium.  Industrial  gas  prices  in Belgium appear  to  be  a 
little above  those  in some  neighbouring countries  and  the  Soviet Union,  in 
particular,  might possibly consider direct sales as  a  way  of breaking  into 
a  market  where  it currently has  no  sales presence.  Nevertheless,  the 
number  of industrial users both willing and able  to  conclude  a  direct 
purchase  deal will probably  remain fairly small. 
B7.  It is extremely difficult  to  predict precisely what  proportion of the 
market might  be  served by direct sales.  As  a  working  assumption,  we 
postulate  that perhaps  7-8%  of industrial consumption may  be  met by direct 
purchases  in 2000;  this  is equivalent  to  around  3%  of the  total Belgian gas 
market. 
BB.  In France,  the  largely vertically-integrated nature of the  industry 
is  such that the  option of direct buying by  local distribution companies 
scarcely exists.  There  is,  however,  the possibility that Elf might  seek to 
make  direct purchases  for  some  of its SNGSO  and  CeFeM  gas  requirements  as 
Lacq  supplies  continue  to  decline.  Indeed,  the  company  sought  to  buy 
direct  from  Norway  at the  time  of  the Troll negotiations but eventually 
reached agreement  for  the  on-sale  of gas  to be  imported  from  Norway  by  GdF. 
B9.  Natural  gas  is very little used in the  power  sector and  the  low  load 
factor of peaking plant utilisation would make  this market  less attractive 
to  gas  producers wishing  to  make  a  direct sale  than other potential sales 
opportunities.  Moreover,  state-owned electricity company  EdF  is perhaps 
unlikely  to  try to  buy  gas  direct,  over  the head of state-owned Gaz  de 
France. 
BlO.  By  far  the  largest  industrial gas  user  in France  is  the  chemical 
industry,  which  in  1987  consumed almost  50  TWh  (some  16%  of total 
consumption in the  French  gas  market  as  a  whole),  of which  almost half was 
used by  the fertiliser industry.  As  in most  other Member  States with  a 
gas-based fertiliser industry,  this sector is understood  to benefit  from 
special  low  prices,  aligned with  the  'F'  tariff for  ammonia  producers  in 
the Netherlands.  From  our analysis  in Section II,  it appears  that  French 
gas  purchase  costs  are  above  the  European  average  and  this  might  mean  an 
interest from  other industrialists in common  carriage.  However,  the apparent negative  GdF  margin  on  industrial sales offsets  the  relatively 
high purchase  costs  to  some  extent.  In practice,  the  interest of some 
large  industrial  groups  in direct buying may  be  constrained by  their state 
ownership.  Overall,  we  assume  that  5%  of the  industrial market  is met  by 
direct sales  in 2000,  equivalent  to  around  2%  of total gas  consumption. 
Bll.  In Italy,  the  size of  most  local  gas  distributors  is small  (there are 
over  700  in all)  and  many  would  not  be  in a  position to  contemplate  a 
direct purchase.  Of  the  distribution companies  in  the  major cities,  many 
are wholly  or partly owned  by  Italgas  (40%  owned  and effectively controlled 
by  SNAM)  or other  SNAM  distribution subsidiaries.  They  are  thus unlikely 
to by-pass  the  national  transmission company. 
Bl2.  Italian industrial  gas  prices are  among  the  lowest  in the  Community 
and interest in direct purchases  may  be  muted  for  this reason.  On  the 
other hand,  SNAM's  high profit margins  in recent years  might  lead 
industrialists  to consider  that  they  could obtain more  favourable  terms via 
common  carriage.  There  might  also be  increased direct sales  from 
independent  offshore  gas  producers  in Italy to  their own  downstream 
(chemicals)  plants,  especially if the  internal European  energy market 
programme  results  in more  open  licensing of Italian exploration acreage  in 
the  longer  term. 
Bl3.  It is known  that state-owned electricity company  ENEL  envisages  a 
very substantial  increase  in power  station gas  use  over  the  next decade. 
The  power  station gas  burn  is projected in the  new  National  Energy  Plan 
(PEN)  to  double  from  6.4  mtoe  (just under  7  bern)  in 1987  to  13  mtoe  in 
1995.  An  emergency  programme  to boost  generating capacity has  been 
announced,  involving  1300  MW  of gas  turbine capacity  to  're-power'  existing 
oil units  and  1500  MW  of new  combined cycle plant,  as  well as  the 
conversion of the  almost  completed Montalto nuclear station to  burn gas. 
In order  to ensure  that it gets  the  most  competitive  gas  prices  from  SNAM, 
ENEL  might be  prepared to  consider buying a  proportion of its additional 
gas  requirements  from  another  supplier.  ,. Bl4.  As  a  working  assumption,  we  postulate  that  7%  of  the  combined 
industry/power sector  gas  market  might  be  supplied direct via common 
carriage  in  2000,  accounting  for  around  4%  of  the  total market  in Italy. 
Bl5.  Gas  prices  in the  Netherlands  are  relatively low  and  we  do  not 
believe  that there would be  great  interest from  industrial users  in direct 
buying,  via common  carriage.  VEGIN  are  known  to consider  the  Gasunie  price 
to  them  to be  too high,  but  the distributors are  not  in a  good position to 
make  a  direct deal  and  they are also contractually committed  to purchase 
from  Gasunie.  It is conceivable  that  the electricity association  SEP  might 
wish  to  seek other gas  suppliers,  over  and  above  its recent deal with 
Norwegian sellers.  However,  Gasunie's  recently publicised acceptance  of 
coal  indexation for  gas  prices charged to  SEP  takes  away  some  of the 
attraction of such  arrangements  from  the electricity industry's point of 
view.  By  2000,  we  assume  for  illustrative purposes  that  5%  of the 
industry/power market  is  supplied direct via common  carriage,  equivalent  to 
2%  of  the  Dutch  gas  market  overall. 
816.  In Spain,  the  large proportion of industrial use  in total consumption 
exposes  ENAGAS  to  some  risk of losing customers  to  common  carriage, 
especially as  large user  gas  prices  appear  to be  somewhat  above  the 
Community  average.  However,  few  consumers  are  likely to have  attained a 
scale of gas  use  sufficient  to  make  them  attractive  to potential direct 
sellers.  Spain is also  geographically remote  from  those  producing 
countries  (especially the  USSR)  with which  ENAGAS  has  no  purchase  contract 
and which might  wish  to break into  the  market.  It would  therefore  be 
surprising if use  of common  carriage were  to  emerge  on  a  large  scale by 
2000.  We  assume  that it might  amount  to  5%  of industry/power market 
consumption or about  3%  of total gas  sales. 
Bl7.  Local  distribution companies  in West  Germany  are  generally fairly 
small  (there are  over  500  in total)  and  only  a  few  large  Stadtwerke  would 
be  of a  sufficient size  to  make  them  credible  as  direct purchasers. 
Moreover,  they  tend  to have  a  requirement  for  supplies  on  low  load  factor, 
which  would  render  them  less attractive  to  a  direct seller.  Thus  they 
would  require  a  storage  service  as  well  as  a  transportation service  from 
transmission  companies  if they were  to  buy direct.  There  is,  in our view, a  possibility that  a  regional  transmission  company  might  seek to purchase 
direct,  as  suggested at  one  time  by  Bayerngas.  The  regional  suppliers  are 
quite  large  (Bayerngas  purchases  as  much  gas  as  Belgium's  Distrigaz,  for 
example)  and  take  gas  on  a  higher  load factor  than most  distribution 
companies,  as  they often make  a  proportion of direct industrial sales  and, 
in some  cases,  have  seasonal  storage facilities of their own.  EWE,  for 
example,  has  a  long-standing contract with Gasunie  for  imports  of Dutch 
gas.  However,  many  regional  transmission companies  are part-owned by  the 
large producing or  importing utilities  (BEB  and,  especially,  Ruhrgas),  so 
this makes  them  less  likely to  purchase direct  - especially if common 
carriage were  required  to effect  the  deal.  Since  the  regional  companies 
are unlikely to  be  able  to  buy  on  more  advantageous  terms  than Ruhrgas 
(which  is much  larger,  takes  on  a  higher  load factor  and has  more 
commercial  experience),  we  consider  that Ruhrgas  and  BEB  will generally  bf~ 
able  to offer sufficiently attractive  terms  to  'head off'  by-pass 
proposals.  This  appears  to  have  been  the  case with Bayerngas,  for  examplE!. 
Bl8.  There  is clearly some  interest in direct buying via common  carriage 
among  large  industrial users,  especi.ally chemical  concerns  who  take 
considerable volumes  on high  load factor at a  few  sites.  Such  gas  is often 
used as  an  ammonia  feedstock or as  a  fuel  for  industrial auto-generation of 
electricity.  West  German  industrial  gas  prices are still individually 
negotiated and  appear,  in some  cases,  to be  above  those  in some 
neighbouring Member  States.  This  could reinforce  interest in direct 
purchasing by  the  larger high-margin customers  of  transmission companies. 
Moreover,  some  medium  sized industrial customers  currently supplied by 
regional  transmission or  local distribution companies  might  seek a  direct 
supply  from  an  importing  transmission company,  via common  carriage. 
Bl9.  Since  the Jahrhundertvertrag agreements  of 1980  on  the  use  of 
indigenous  hard coal  in West  German  power  stations,  the  use  of natural  gas 
for  electricity generation has  declined considerably and  is primarily 
confined to peaking load  (in the  case  of  the  large  DVG  generating companies 
who  are  also  regional  suppliers)  and middle  merit order positions  in the 
case  of some  gas-burning plant  owned  by  Stadtwerke.  While  gas  continues  to 
be  used  on relatively  low  load  factors  (only  a  few  hundred hours  in peaking 
stations  and  perhaps  3,000-4,UOO  hours  in mid-merit positions),  the  power 
f market  is unlikely  to  be  of great  interest to  most  potential direct 
suppliers.  By  the  turn of  the  century,  however,  it now  seems  likely that 
the Jahrhundertvertrag obligations will be  significantly lower  than  today's 
level of 45  million  tonnes.  Indigenous  coal  may  be  substituted by coal 
imports  or electricity purchases  from  abroad,  but  there  may  also  be 
opportunities  for natural  gas  to  increase its market  share  again if pricing 
is competitive.  If so,  it is conceivable  that  some  of the  gas  could be 
purchased direct by  the  power utilities, via common  carriage,  especially as 
producing countries would be  keen  to  compete  for  a  significant new  market. 
B20.  Taking all these possibilities  into account,  we  consider that perhaps 
4%  of the  total West  German  market  might  be  supplied via common  carriage  in 
2000  - representing a  combination of direct sales  to  industrial users, 
power  companies  and  regional  gas  suppliers. 
B21.  In the United Kingdom,  the  new  industrial gas  pricing schedules  and 
the  obligation on British Gas  to offer interruptible  terms  to  'premium' 
industrial users  (with  a  gas  oil or  LPG  alternative to natural  gas)  on  a 
non-discriminatory basis  may  tend  to  reduce  some  of the  interest in direct 
buying.  Nevertheless,  there will  no  doubt  continue  to  be  large  firm  gas 
consumers  who  consider  that  the  BG  trading margin  is excessive.  It has 
recently been reported that AGAS  have  secured a  carriage  agreement  with 
British Gas  for direct marketing  of some  170 million therms  p.a.  (about 0.5 
bern/a)  purchased  from  UK  gas  producers.  This  in itself is less  than  l%  of 
the  total gas  market,  but  AGAS  plan to  increase sales  to  500-600  therms 
p.a.  over  the  next 4-5  years  and  the  deal  also sets  a  precedent  for  other 
would-be  competitors. 
B22.  There  is also considerable  interest in gas-fired power  generation and 
we  would  expect  to  see  around  6  GW  of plant  in use  by  the  end of  the 
century,  including  the  Peterhead plant  in Scotland which  is already 
contracted to  take Miller  gas  on  a  direct supply  which  does  not  involve 
common  carriage.  This  amount  of gas  plant  could burn over  10  bern/a,  as  we 
expect  the  stations  to  achieve  a  high merit order position,  below nuclear 
but  above  many  older coal-fired stations.  Much  of this  could be  supplied 
direct and  the  inland  gas  stations are  likely to  require  some  form  of 
carriage  through  the  BG  system.  Overall,  we  assume  that up  to  7%  of the gas  market  in Great  Britain will be  supplied via  common  carriage  in  2000. 
This  takes  into  account  the  Government•s  recent decision that no  more  than 
90%  of total  UK  gas  supplies  under  all new  contracts  may  be  sold to  BG  with 
effect from  May  1989. 
Overview 
B23.  It should be  stressed that we  have  made  a  number  of working 
assumptions  regarding  the  extent of common  carriage,  to provide  a 
quantitative basis  for  discussing its likely effects.  These  are hypothes,es 
rather  than precise predictions  and  we  consider  that,  depending  on  the way 
gas  transmission companies  respond  to  the possibility of common  carriage, 
the  actual proportion of the  market  supplied direct via common  carriage  in 
2000  may  well be  less  than we  have  assumed  for  the purposes  of 
illustration. 
B24.  Our  working hypotheses  regarding  the  extent of common  carriage  in 
2000  are  summarised  in Table  Bl  below,  using  the  latest  (December  1988) 
forecasts  collected by  DG  XVII  for  total  gas  consumption  in that year:-
Table  Bl:  Assumed  Extent  of Gas  Common  Carriage  in  2000 
.fi  E  1  NL  SP  FRG  UK  Total(7) 
% of total market  3  3  4  2  3  4  7  4 
Energy  (in mtoe)  0.2  0.6  2.0  0.7  0.2  1.8  3.6  9.1 
Volume  (in Bern)  0.2  0.7  2.4  0.9  0.2  2.1  4.3  10.8 
B25.  We  thus  envisage  an  above-average  level  of direct sales  in the  UK, 
while  the  Netherlands,  in particular,  is projected to  see  a  relatively low 
level of common  carriage.  The  seven Member  States considered together 
account  for  96%  of projected natural  gas  consumption across  the  Community 
in 2000;  if the  pattern outlined above  were  repeated  in  the  other five 
Member  States,  then a  total of some  9.5  mtoe  (11  bern/a)  would be  supplied 
via common  carriage  in the  12  Member  States  as  a  whole. B26.  It is  important  to  emphasise  at this point that  the  significance of 
common  carriage  is likely to  be  far  greater  than  the  assumed direct sales 
share  of  the  total  gas  market  would  suggest.  Provided at least some 
carriage deals  are  concluded,  existing gas  suppliers will be  made  aware  of 
a  new  competitive  threat  from  direct sales.  This  could  then  lead to 
changes  in gas  pricing policy and  increased efficiency in transmission and 
distribution,  as  discussed  in subsequent  sections of this  report. 
B27.  Gas  purchases via common  carriage are also  likely to have  a 
"knock-on"  effect on  gas  in transit between Member  States.  Based on 
currently contracted gas  supplies  for  2000  as  reported by  DG  XVII,  Figure 
Bl  overleaf illustrates schematically the principal  inter-country flows  of 
natural  gas within the  interconnected European grid.  The  data  on which 
Figure  Bl  is based is set out  in Table  B2  below: NATURAL  GAS  FLOWS  Fig.B.1 
IN  THE  INTERCONNECTED  EUROPEAN  GRID 
Year  2000 
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Table  B2:  Natural  Gas  Flows  in  the  Interconnected  Euro12ean  Grict*1 
(Year  2000,  in  mtoe) 
Norwegian  ExQorts 
To:  Belgium  France  Spain  Netherlands  West  Germany 
Via:  Zeebrugge  Zeebrugge  Zeebrugge  Emden  Emden 
Amount:  2.0  6.3  0.8  3.8  7.1 
Algerian  Ex12orts 
To:  Belgium  France  Spain  Italy  Greece 
Via:  LNG  LNG  LNG  Trans-med  LNG 
Amount:  2.9  4.5  3.8  10.0  0.5 
USSR  Exports 
To:  France  Italy  West  Germany  Greece 
Amount  9.1  10.8  12.6  1.8 
Dutch  Exports 
To:  Belgium  France  Italy  West  Germany 
Amount:  3.4*2  3.8  3.3  11.9 
Gas  Flow.  Netherlands  - West  German:2: 
Exporter:  Netherlands  Netherlands  Norway 
Importer:  West  Germany  Italy  Netherlands 
Flow:  11.9  3.3  (3.8) 
Gas  Flow.  Netherlands  - Belgium 
Exporter:  Netherlands  Netherlands  Total 
Importer:  France  Belgium 
Flow:  3.8  3.4*2  7.2 
Gas  Flow.  Belgium  - France 
Exporter:  Netherlands  Norway  Norway  Total 
Importer:  France  France  Spain 
Flow:  3.8  6.3  0.8  10.9 
*1  Based on  DG  XVII  data  (from  December  1988),  plus  new  contracts  from 
Norway  to  Spain  (0.8  mtoe)  and  SEP  of  the  Netherlands  (1.7 mtoe). 
Table  shows  contracted purchases  only and excludes  trade  involving 
non-member  countries  (Austria,  Switzerland etc) 
Total 
20.0 
Total 
21.7 
Total 
34.3 
Total 
22.4 
Total 
11.4 
*2  Includes  0.4 mtoe  exported  from  Netherlands  to  Belgium and sold on by 
Distrigaz  to  SOTEG  of Luxembourg B28.  We  estimate  that,  in  2000,  around  20%  of natural  gas  consumed  in  the 
Community  will cross  at least  one  border within  the  Community  and  some  12% 
will  traverse  one  or  more  Member  States  in transit to  another Member  State, 
as  set out below:-
Exporter 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Norway 
Norway 
USSR 
Table  B3:  Contracted Gas  Exports/Imports  in Transit 
(Year  2000,  in mtoe) 
Importer  In Transit  Throu~h  Volume 
France  Belgium  3.8 
Italy  West  Germany,  Switzerland  3.3 
Luxembourg*  Belgium  0.4 
Netherlands  West  Germany  3.8 
France  Belgium  6.3 
Spain  Belgium,  France  0.8 
France  West  Germany  _2.1 
27.5 
*  indirect imports,  on-sold by  Distrigaz  to  SOTEG 
B29.  Thus  Belgium  and  West  Germany  will continue  to be  the main transit 
countries,  with  11.3  mtoe  and  16.2  mtoe  respectively in transit to other 
Member  States,  plus  (in  the  case  of West  Germany)  gas  destined for sale  in 
Austria and Switzerland.  Moves  towards  the  use  of direct marketing via 
common  carriage would  be  likely to  lead to  an  increased level of gas  in 
transit,  providing additional opportunities  for profitable  transportation 
business  for  the  pipeline  owners  concerned.  This  would  be  the  case,  for 
example,  with direct sales of Soviet  gas  to  Belgium  (increased transit 
through West  Germany)  or Algerian direct sales  to  West  Germany. i-115 
Appendix  C 
U.S.  Experience U.S.  Experience 
Cl.  In this Appendix,  we  set out briefly some  evidence  on  the 
quantitative  impact  of  the shift towards  open access  transportation in the 
United States  from  around  1984  onwards.  As  shown  in Table  Cl  below,  ther·e 
was  a  marked fall  in average  'wholesale'  gas  prices  (at the wellhead, 
producer-pipeline delivery point,  border or  import  terminal)  over  the 
period 1984-87,  in particular.  This  fall was  also reflected in lower 
prices  for  sales  from  pipelines  to  local distribution companies  (LDCs)  at 
the  City Gate.  Moreover,  the  growing  'spot'  market offered opportunities 
for  LDCs  and  large  consumers  to  buy  direct from  producers at wellhead 
prices well  below  the  average  cost of gas  delivered to  the  major 
inter-state pipelines. 
Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988** 
* 
** 
Table  Cl:  Average  US  w~olesale Gas  Prices,  1982-88 
(in $/1,000  cubic  feet) 
Wellhead  Producer*  Imports  City Gate 
2.46  2.72  5.03  n/a 
2.59  2.93  4.78  n/a 
2.66  2.91  4.08  3.95 
2.51  2.86  3.21  3.75 
1.94  2.39  2.44  3.22 
1.67  2.12  2.14  2.87 
1.71  2.08  2.04  2.83 
Average  price of gas  sales  from  producers  to  major  inter-state 
pipelines 
Year  to  September  1988 
C2.  Among  final  consumers  of natural  gas,  the  major beneficiaries of  the 
decline  in wholesale prices  appear  to have  been  industrial and  power 
station gas  users.  The  pattern of average  retail gas prices  in the  U.S. 
over  the  period  1982-88  is  shown  in Table  C2  below.  This  shows  that 
residential  gas  prices  fell by  around  9%  between  1984  and  1987,  while .. 
commercial prices  declined  14%,  industrial prices  by  26%  and electric 
utility prices by  as  much  as  37%. 
Table  C2:  Average  U.S.  Retail  Gas  Prices.  1982-88 
(in $/1000 cubic  feet) 
Residential  Commercial 
Electric 
Industrial  Utilities  Average 
1982  5.17  4.82  3.61  3.48  4.15 
1983  6.06  5.59  3.94  3.58  4. 64 
1984  6.12  5.55  3.99  3.70  4.67 
1985  6.12  5.50  3.73  3.55  4.54 
1986  5.83  5.08  3.06  2.43  3.97 
1987  5.56  4.76  2.94  2.32  4.06 
1988*  5.90  4.57  2.90  2.32  3.89 
*  Year  to  September  1988 
C3.  An  analysis of gas  company  trading margins  over  the  same  1982-88 
period  (Table  C3  below)  shows  that pipeline  companies'  margins  on 
/t~t 
merchanting activity were  progressively squeezed between  1984  and  1987.  On 
the other hand,  the  margin between City Gate  prices  and  the  average  price 
of retail gas  sales  suggests  that LDCs  may  not have  passed  the entire 
benefit of  lower wholesale  prices  on  to  their consumers. 
Table  C3:  U.S.  Gas  Utilities' Average  Margins.  1982-88 
(in $jl(XX)  cubic feet) 
Average Pipeline Purchase  Price(l) 
Pipeline Margin (2) 
Retail Margin  (3) 
* first  9  months 
2.84  3.02 
1.31  1.62 
(1)  assumes  95%  U.S.  gas,  5%  imports 
2.97  2.88  2.39  2.12  2.08 
0.98  0.87  0.83  0.75  0.75 
0.71  0.79  0.75  1.19  1.06 (2)  City Gate  price  minus  average  pipeline  purchase  price 
(3)  Weighted  average  sales  revenue  minus  City Gate  price 
C4.  There  have  been  some  suggestions,  largely on  the basis of U.S. 
experience,  that a  common  carriage  system in Europe  would unleash 
gas-to-gas  competition which  would  in turn reduce  industrial gas  prices 
below  those  of  the  alternative  fuels  to which  they are  now  linked. 
Although certain U.S.  consumers  may  have  benefitted from  competition 
between  gas  producers  in this way,  there  is little evidence  that this has 
generally been  the  case  for  U.S.  industrial users  as  a  whole.  In Table  Gl~ 
below,  we  compare  U.S.  gas  and oil prices,  as  follows:-
(a)  average  residential  and  commercial  gas  prices versus  the  price of  N<> 
2  fuel  (gas  oil),  excluding  taxes;  and 
(b)  average  industrial  and electric utility gas  prices versus  the price 
of low  sulphur residual fuel  oil,  also net of  tax. 
Table  C4:  Relative U.S.  Oil  and  Gas  Prices.  1982-87 
(in $/mmBtu) 
Natural  Gas  Oil  Products*  Relative  Price*** 
Year  RIC  ILl:  No  2  Fuel  Resid**  RIC 
1982  4.88  4.01  5.41  4.17  90 
1983  5.75  4. 39  5.48  3.88  105 
1984  5.79  4.35  5.48  4.02  106 
1985  5.77  4.10  5.07  3.59  114 
1986  5.43  3.34  3.35  2.08  162 
1987  5.17  2.91  3.47  2.47  149 
*  refiner sales prices  to  end users,  excluding  taxes 
**  less  than  1%  sulphur 
***  gas  as  % of oil 
I/P 
96 
113 
108 
114 
161 
118 
This  comparison  shows  that  small  user  gas  prices fell  much  more  slowly  than 
gas oil prices  over  1984-87.  Industrial  and electric utility gas  prices 
fell  somewhat  more  slowly  than  residual oil prices  over  the period as  a 
whole,  and  dramatically less  so  in 1986  when  resid fell  to below  60%  of its 
price  in 1985.  In spite of  open  access  transportation,  therefore,  there is little to  suggest  that competition led to  gas  prices  falling faster  than 
those  of alternative oil fuels. /130 
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Terms  of Reference ., 
~·-E Cew..tSSION 
J  OF  1l£ EUROPEAN 
COMM.JNTES 
OIRECTOI'ATE-C£t€RAL.  FOR  ENERGY 
Oil  AHJ  NATlJIAL.  CAS  DIRECTORATE 
Brussels, 
XVII-C-3 
LB/ab  Z  4. 0  2. 8  9  I X  V  II/ 
SubJect:  Follow-up study to C  &  L  report  on  natural  gas coa.on 
carriage 
Dear  Mr  Gosklrk, 
We  take this opportunity to  thank  you  for  the excellent  study that 
C & L Belmont  carried out  on  ·rhe  advantages  and  drawbacks  for  the 
European  Community  of the  Introduction of a  system of common  carrjer 
for  the transport of natural  gas·. 
This  study will  be of considerable help  In  the  framework  of our  current 
work  on  the  Internal  market  for  energy and  gas  In  particular. 
We  think  It  necessary to complete your  study with some  elements of 
quantification  that  we  did not  Include,  so  far,  In  the  terms of 
reference of the abovementioned  study. 
The  quantitative assessment  we  need concerns  the  following  results  from 
the possible  Introduction of a  common  carriage system  for  gas: 
Mr  W.I.M.  Gosklrk 
Director,  011  & Gas 
Coopers  &  Lybrand 
Plumtree Court 
GB  - LONDON  EC4A  4HT 
0.2 50 0 
Proviaionol  oc:ldreee:  Rue  de  Ia  Loi  200  •  8  - 1049  Bruee•l•  - Belgium  - Tel~  direct  liM 23 .....  \elephotMI  exchange  2~ 11  11  a  236  11  H 
Telex:  COt.£U  8  21877  - Teleg'aphic  oc:ldresa:  COWElJI  BrueMia  - Fax:  2~  01  ~ - 2  -
(I)  possible reduction  in  the border  price of gas  imported  Into 
the Community, 
(if)  possible  increased efficiency  in  transmission  and  distri-
bution operations; 
(Ill) 
(IV) 
possible redistribution of  Income  between  gas  companies  and 
consumers,  or  between different classes of consumers; 
Indication of macro-economic  benefit of possible reduced 
industrial  gas  prices. 
These  elements  would  form  part  of our  global  evaluation of the desir-
ability of  Introducing  at  Community  level  a  system of common  carriage 
for  gas. 
We  would  need  to have  the results of this economic  evaluation by end 
Apr II  1989. 
For  that  purpose,  we  would  provide you  with all  relevant  documents  that 
exist  In  the Commission  and  that  would  be of help to you. 
Can  you  please  Inform  us  whether  you  accept  to carry out  this assess-
ment  along  the  lines of this  letter  and  at  which  price,  In  Ecus.  We 
would  also appreciate an  Indication of the man/weeks  Involved. 
Yours  sincerely, 
R.  De  Bauw 
.. 